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PREFACE 
Estonia started with its economic reforms more than 5 years ago. In its 
finance policy the country intended to emphasize fixed exchange rate 
and currency board principles, nonprogrerssive taxrates and balanced 
national budget. 
Estonia has well succeeded in its economic reforms. This fact has lead 
researchers and politicians to confirm that owing to the successful 
currency reform in 1992 the foundation for Estonian's economic 
development and integration into international cooperation structures 
could be laid. 
On May 1994, an international conference on theme "The Theory and 
Teaching of Finance and Accounting in the Transition Economy" took 
place in Tartu. The conference participants asserted the need to continue 
the research on financial issues of transition economies. A collection of 
reports and theses hold on the Second International Conference on 
Transition Economies is published. The theme of the conference was 
"Financial Issues of Transition Economies and it took place in Tartu on 
April 16-17, 1995. 
According to the opinion of the conference organizers the undertaking 
was a success, which was mainly thanks to the interesting and 
substantive reports, a numerous audience (over 80 students and more 
than 40 scientists and lectures) and active discussion. It is hoped that 
useful knowledge and arisen ideas will find extensive application in 
advancing Estonian economic policy and education. 
Lots of friends and collegues were involved in organizing the 
conference. Special thanks to the organizors prof. Vambola Raudsepp, 
assist, prof. Toomas Haldma and secretary for the Conference Mrs Ülle 
Vaaks. Thanks from all our hearts to Estonian newspaper Postimees, 
founded in 1857 for substantial financial support. 
With best wishes and hope for further meetings in Tartu. 
Prof. Mart Sõrg 
Chairperson of the Conference Steering Conimitee 
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THE ESTONIAN PAYMENTS SYSTEM: AN 
APPRAISAL 
George A. Hachey, Karin LUkane, Priit Koit 
The purpose of this paper is to review and evaluate the progress Estonia 
has made in reforming its payments system. The evaluation of the system 
will be made against a background of the reforms other transforming 
economies have had to make in their transition from the Soviet 
centralized economic system to the market based economic system. 
Given this, we will determine if Estonia has introduced certain key 
institutional features which typically enhance payments efficiency and 
we will analyze data provided by Eesti Pank (the central bank; in English 
it is Bank of Estonia and hereafter will be referenced as ВОЕ) to test 
some simple hypotheses of expected changes in variables related to the 
development of the system. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section I discusses the role and 
importance of payment systems in both a centralized and a market 
economic context; Section П presents some guideposts for the 
development of payments systems and interbank money markets drawn 
from previous research, including an extended discussion of central bank 
float; Section Ш provides an overview of the Estonian payment system 
and interbank market; Section IV analyzes the available data to attempt 
an assessment of the progress made by the Estonian payments system; 
Section V offers a summary and conclusions. 
I. The Importance of Payments In Financial Systems 
Under the centralized economy of the Soviet Union, a system for making 
payments efficiently and effectively was not needed. The Soviet 
financial system was based on the activities of a monobank which 
functioned as both a central bank and as a commercial bank. Its activities 
were supplemented by a number of specialized banks {in Estonia, these 
were Hoiupank (savings bank), Valismajanduspank (foreign economic 
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bank), Agrompank (agriculture bank) Sotsiaalpank (social bank), and 
Toostus ja EMtuspank (industry and construction bank)}. Individual 
enterprises were assigned to a particular bank depending on the nature of 
their economic activities. This structure limited the volume of interbank 
payments and the amount of competition in the financial system. 
Enterprises simply borrowed unlimited amounts from the bank to which 
they were assigned in making transactions authorized by the central plan. 
It was not urgent for these ente rises to have fimds available in their 
accounts to make authorized expenditures. There were no financial 
penalties imposed and no threat of bankruptcy; banks functioned merely 
as book keeping entities with little or no real economic function. [7, p. 
855] 
However, the subsequent breakup of the monobank system in the early 
days of economic transformation (in Estonia, this actually occurred 
before independence) made intrabank settlements into interbank 
payments and makes the speedy and effective functioning of the 
payments system take on much greater importance. [7, p. 856] 
A payment system capable of speedy settlement of transactions in goods, 
services and basic securities is a critically important component of a 
well-functioning market economy. [7, p. 849] Measures to ensure the 
integrity of the payment mechanism and eliminate long and uncertain 
delays in settlement are therefore an essential part of the financial system 
reform in formerly centrally planned economies. [1, p. 385] The 
efficiency and certainty of clearing and settlement systems affects the 
demand for bank reserves held in the central bank and other clearing 
centers, which are the ultimate means of noncash settlement for 
payments. At the same time, the level of development of the payments 
system influences the nature and activity levels of money markets, which 
are, among other things, a vehicle for obtaining and trading settlement 
balances. Ceteris paribus, the higher is the level of development of the 
payments system, the lower will be the level of excess reserves and the 
greater will be the volume of interbank activity. 
II. Operational Guldeposts 
An effective payments system has two vital elements. The first is trust 
among the participants, expressed as a willingness to postpone 
settlement of an obligation in good fimds. Banks may extend credit to 
each other to meet payment imbalances rather than insisting on 
settlement in currency or central bank deposits. [7, p. 849] The second 
vital requirement is discipline. [7, p. 850] Transactors could use the 
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system to incur unsustainable balances between their payments and 
receipts. Discipline requires that they manage their liquid assets 
effectively so that settlement in good funds can be made at sufficiently 
frequent intervals. 
Failure of either trust or discipline can impair the efficiency of the 
payment system, and indeed of the financial system as a whole. If banks 
distrust each other, they will insist on settlement in central bank deposits; 
banks will then hold large amounts of reserves or of securities that the 
central bank will discount and will intermediate far less between private 
borrowers and lenders. More transactions will require settlement in 
central bank liabilities, and the central bank will have to intermediate 
between borrowers and lenders. Such a system is usually characterized 
as illiquid and this illiquidity can have a substantial negative impact on 
economic growth and development. 
A failure of discipline can also undermine the payment system. Financial 
discipline tends to be weak when market participants come to expect to 
be bailed out for their excesses and mistakes. If transactors ultimately 
expect to be indemnified for any losses resulting from bad debts, they 
have no incentive either to insist on settlement in good funds or to 
monitor the creditworthiness of their counte a ties. In this case, the 
arrears in payments will continue to mount, both within the banking 
system and elsewhere in the economy. If the creation of credit through 
the payments system is unchecked, it frustrates the system's purpose of 
facilitating the exchange of objects of value; it may instead become a 
mechanism through which transactors try to obtain a larger share of the 
eventual bailout. 
Payment systems are afflicted with two basic types of risk. The first is 
liquidity risk or the risk that a participant, although solvent, might be 
unable to make a timely transaction because of a lack of readily available 
means of payment. The second is credit risk. In event of bankruptcy of 
one of the participants, others would be faced with losses. Most 
payments systems can withstand occasional occurrences of both. 
However, the major fear is that the system may be so fragile that these 
occasional occurrences might mushroom and become systemic. 
[7, p. 860] 
Inadequate supervision and regulation can exacerbate the dangers from 
liquidity risk and solvency risk. If weak banks are allowed to have direct 
access to the interbank payments system, they create severe risks of 
nonsettlement. This can easily lead to systemic breakdown. The 
management of settlement risk requires the effective implementation of 
strong regulations limiting the amount of credit implicitly extended 
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through the payment system and clear rules stipulating when a payee can 
gain access to fimds. 
To see how the various parts of the system fit together, we provide a 
brief discussion of the Finnish payments system. Our intent is to use it as 
a basis for the discussion of how a developed payments system 
engenders trust and discipline among the participants and also how it 
manages the tradeoff between settlement risk and efficiency. This 
discussion of the general principals found in all payments systems will 
also serve as a point of departure for the examination and evaluation of 
the Estonian payments system. 
Any payments system experiences a tradeoff between the allocation of 
risk in the system, which affects discipline, and the system's efficiency in 
effecting payments. [7, p.863] The Bank of Finland (hereafter BOF) has 
recently been grappling with just this problem in the context of a 
modernizing financial structure characterized by increasing volumes of 
large value interbank payments. In particular,, this central bank, like 
central banks elsewhere which have to cope with the requirements of 
sophisticated financial markets, institutions and transactions has been 
quite concerned with the problem of daylight overdrafts. [For the case in 
the US, see 10.] These overdrafts are deficits in the reserve or settlement 
accounts of eligible financial institutions with accounts at the central 
bank. They arise in the process of settling interbank claims when the 
central bank debits the account of the remitting bank and credits the 
account of the receiving bank. This transfer from the remitting bank 
becomes final when the receiving bank is informed of the payment 
request and cannot be revoked by the central bank even if the remitting 
bank does not have a sufficient balance to cover the transfer. The latter 
need post sufficient funds only at the end of the day. So, if its reserve 
balance turns negative during the day, the result is a type of loan from 
the central bank to cover the deficit which exposes the central bank to 
settlement risk in the event the negative balance is not covered. [8, p. 8] 
The problem is, however, that there is an expectation that the central 
bank will provide this credit and take this risk in order to keep the 
payments process functioning smoothly. The alternative is to delay 
payments until they are funded by receipts, but the minimization of the 
time lag between initiation of the payment instruction and final 
settlement is increasingly important. [8, p. 9] 
When Finland's interbank clearing system was introduced by the BOF, 
access to these daylight overdrafts was without limit and without cost. 
Subsequently, however, borrowing limits were imposed and banks using 
the system had to post collateral equivalent to 25% of their overdraft 
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limits. This reduced the risk exposure of the BOF and did not appear to 
reduce the system's efficiency. [8, p. 10] Moreover, since July 1992, the 
BOF has paid market interest rates on excess reserves (call money). As a 
result, there has been a significant increase in the level of excess reserves 
in the system and this has also tended to reduce liquidity risks in the 
payments system. 
Thus, an important element in the assessment of Estonia's payment 
system is how the Bank of Estonia approaches this tradeoff given its 
stage of development and given the type and volume of transactions 
which must be settled. 
Moreover, inefficiencies and uncertain delays in clearing and setdements 
in other transforming economies has resulted in payments system 
gridlock - an accumulation of unprocessed payment orders due to 
insufficient funds in the payers account, possibly triggered by delays in 
the receipt of funds. Such a situation could contribute to large 
interenterprise arrears which end up being treated as nonpaying financial 
assets on enterprise books. This condition can also reduce the desire to 
use bank services and delay the widespread movement from a cash 
society to a more efficient payment systems. Delays in receiving 
payments can also erode the real value of these payments during sha ly 
inflationary periods and increase the demand for credit by both 
governments and ente rises. [1, p. 387] 
Operational breakdowns in the payments system become more likely 
when the increase in the number of payments (due to a larger number of 
banks and emergence of financial markets) puts pressure on existing 
payment processing arrangements. A buildup of backlogs in the 
processing of payments would raise the size of float, and affect the 
systems liquidity. The resulting delays in processing and verification of 
payments create opportunities for fraud. Fraudulent payment transfers 
could profit from delays in verification and poorly designed security 
features, and could result in major losses. 
A problem which vexes all payment systems concerns float. The large 
size and variability of payments float complicates monetary policy and 
compromises economic growth. Float refers to amounts that have been 
debited (credited) from (to) a payer's (payee's) account before the 
corresponding credit (debit) entry has been posted in a payee's (payer's) 
account. It reflects differences in timing between crediting and debiting 
of accounts caused by delays in the transmission of payment information 
and in the subsequent registration of accounting entries. Large and 
variable lags between the time of debiting and crediting bank accounts 
with the central bank (bank float) or customer accounts with banks 
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(customer float) could arise from a lack of operating standards in the 
processing of payments, inadequate or poorly enforced rules and 
regulations on clearing procedures and settlement methods, and 
unreliability of systems used for the transport and delivery of payment 
information. [1, p. 385] 
Debiting (crediting) of a bank settlement account before crediting 
(debiting) the receiving (sending) bank leads to a withdrawal (supply) of 
liquidity; variable lags in such debiting and crediting could result in 
large day-to-day variations in the size of reserves or deposits, both in the 
aggregate and in individual banks. This forces commercial banks to hold 
large levels of excess reserves or rely on central bank accommodation. 
The factors that cause large and variable float also exacerbate payment 
risks. [1, p. 386] 
It is true that the more important linkages are between float and various 
aspects of central bank money management policies. This is not so 
important in Estonia given the currency board framework for monetary 
policy. The Bank of Estonia does not operate on the size of reserves in 
the banking system to affect interest rates, for example. But there are still 
some important considerations that should be examined especially with 
regards to the efficiency of the payments system and the consequent 
impact on economic growth. 
Large and unpredictable variations in the amount of float distort liquidity 
management by both central bank and commercial banks. If banks must 
hold large excess reserves as a buffer against the variability of reserves, 
then this affects the demand for various money market instruments. This 
can also undermine the development of well functioning interbank 
markets in both domestic instruments and in foreign exchange. 
Consequently, an important indicator of progress in the reform of the 
payment system is a reduction of the level and variability of float both 
among commercial banks and the cenitral bank and between and 
individual bank and its customers. 
There are a number of different reforms that a central bank should 
implement early on in the transformation process to enhance the proper 
functioning of the payments system. In the medium term, it can introduce 
gross settlement arrangements for large-value transactions that require 
finality, a high degree of security, and immediate, same-day, or value-
dated settlements, as well as net settlement arrangements through 
clearing houses for smaller payments. Finality of settlement means that 
once a payment message is sent, it is certain that the payee will receive 
good funds that cannot be reversed, even if the payor subsequently 
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becomes insolvent. This risk is not eliminated by proper procedures, 
rather it is shared in varying degrees by the central bank, the clearing 
house, the participating commercial banks or the unsecured creditors of 
the defaulting party. [1, p. 388] 
A related issue has to do with the technology used to process these 
payments; efficiency is enhanced when the processing is done 
electronically rather than by hand. During the early days of commercial 
banking in Eastern and Central Europe, bills trading frequently required 
the physical transfer of paper from one window to another at the central 
bank. Also, primitive telecommunications facilities hindered payments 
transfers by phone and also the use of more sophisticated electronic 
funds transfers. 
In most countries in Eastern and Central Europe, the initial structure of 
the payments system was one of gross settlements, but based on slow 
paper-based clearing procedures and lacking any explicit credit or 
guarantees to support settlement. A gross settlement system without 
some sort of credit facility as discussed above for the case of Finland 
typically requires a larger amount of settlement balances than a net 
settlement system. It can also lead to gridlock if settlement balances 
prove insufficient. 
Another problem that appeared in Central Europe during the early days 
of commercial banking is that each branch of some banks had their own 
accounts with the central bank. If a branch had a negative balance with 
the central bank, then it had to get funds from the refinance facility at 
penalty rates even if the bank as a whole had a net positive balance. 
Also, banks had to use central bank facilities to make intrabank transfers 
and made up a lot of the transactions carried over the telegraphic transfer 
facilities. These branches must be consolidated in order to treat each 
bank rather than each branch as a unit. The alternative is a situation 
where each bank must have multiple clearing accounts. 
The legacy of the Soviet financial system also makes current central 
bank refinancing activities suspect and dangerous. Under the monobank 
system, account overdrafts were frequent and of little consequence. The 
problem which has emerged in Russia and other CIS countries is that 
overdraft coverage by the central bank can become open ended and lead 
to excess liquidity, lack of payments discipline and inflationary 
pressures. Access to this overdraft protection may also be done on a 
preferential basis to support preferred enterprises and activities. 
[7, p. 859] 
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III. Estonian Payments System and Interbank Money Market 
Estonian Currency Board 
Any discussion of money systems in Estonia must include a discussion 
of the currency board system. However, in the context of the present 
paper, this discussion will be brief. The currency board is discussed in 
much detail elsewhere [2, 12], and the role of the currency board for 
Estonia's payments system and interbank market is somewhat tangential. 
Here, only two aspects are worth mentioning: first the imposition of 
reserve requirements and the second is the fixed exchange rate with the 
German deutschemark. 
The fact that ВОЕ has established required reserves distinguishes its 
variant of the currency board from the classical version because changes 
in the reserve requirement allow it more control over the money supply 
than just the authority to convert foreign currencies into Estonian 
kroons.^ Required reserves for Estonian commercial banks are set at 
10% and were originally established partly because there was no 
effective system of interbank clearing in place at the time and to ensure 
that commercial banks held precautionary balances against unexpected 
cash outflows. [2] 
Secondly, the explicit fixed exchange rate link with the deutschemark 
has eliminated the currency risk for Estonian commercial banks who 
want to invest in short term deutschemark denominated deposits. This is 
the bulk of the entries on their balance sheets which are entered as 
"claims on foreign banks in foreign currencies".^ This practice is so 
common, that the Estonian interbank rate (explained below) tracks very 
closely the DEM deposit rates (discussion with Märten Ross of ВОЕ). 
Yet, Ae low interbank rates are disconnected from the much higher 
customer lending rates posted by banks. This is because ВОЕ carefully 
examines banks before allowing them to access the system and continues 
to monitor their positions at short intervals. As a result, the risks of 
interbank lending are much less than the risks of customer lending, given 
' There is another reason why the Estonian Currency Board is a modification of the 
classical conception and that is because if is a department of ВОЕ and not a 
separate entity. 
^ Foreign deposits are especially attractive to banks with underdeveloped treasury 
departments. Other deposits are made in US dollars, especially in Latvia and with 
correspondent accoimts in the United States. Most of these deposits are demand 
deposits. 
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the operating risks and information deficiencies which afflict the 
enterprise sector. (Discussion with Kaja Kell of ВОЕ). 
The Development of the Estonian Payments System 
Estonia began to move away from the Soviet monobank system in 
December 1989 as Eesti Pank became once again Estonia's central bank. 
For a time, however, both ВОЕ and the Soviet Union's Gosbank were 
operating until the latter was closed down in early 1992. [9, p. 91] 
Consolidation of bank branches also quickly occurred in Estonia, but in 
a way different from other countries. At first, branches of several of the 
old Soviet banks split off and became independent. But of course, this 
had the same effect on the payments system as having branches of a 
given bank using the clearing center to transfer balances among one 
another. But the problem did not last long as the Bank of Estonia began 
to close many of these small banks by establishing minimum capital 
requirements defined not as a ratio, but as a minimum amount of capital 
invested. It also refused to renew the licenses of several small banks and 
to grant licenses to new applicants. However, to this day, few banks have 
correspondent accounts with each other and therefore all use the 
Clearing Division of the ВОЕ for settlements. 
ВОЕ began to require from March 10, 1992 that all banks must complete 
payment transactions in 48 hours or face a late charge. This was done to 
challenge the banks and to force them to recognize the importance of 
efficient clearing for their customers. It also probably reflects the fact 
that one of the banks involved in the banking crisis of early 1993, Union 
Baltic Bank, sometimes took weeks to clear transactions. 
At the present time, all settlement is done electronically and the system 
has the capability to clear within 24 hours. For example, Social Bank 
operated with seven branches In Tallinn, Parnu and Tartu. For 
interbranch clearing, an offline electronic system was used. Payment 
orders were sent from the branches to the main office in Tallinn once or 
twice each day and cleared the next day. Transactions with the main 
office cleared in the same day. There were plans to put all the branches 
on line to effect same day clearing throughout the bank, but Social Bank 
was forced into bankruptcy before this could be implemented. 
Hansapank has an online system for interbranch clearing. Hoiupank has 
an online system for its Tallinn branches and is in the process of 
extending it to its branches throughout Estonia. 
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In 1993 and for most of 1994, banks were promoting themselves to 
custorners on the basis of their ability to clear transactions in 24 hours. 
Recent increases in the amount of float in the system indicate that some 
banks are delaying payments to the fiill 48 hours allowed. (Interview 
with Vladimir Mihailov, Head of the Clearing Division, ВОЕ). With the 
improvement of the current system to one which allows real time 
settlement, large value transactions will be settled on a net basis. That 
capability is not currently present. (Interview with Vladimir Mihailov, 
Head of the Clearing Division, ВОЕ). 
ВОЕ Supervision and Regulation of the System 
ВОЕ has established several rules which bear on the issues of payments 
system trust and discipline and also attest to its activity in managing 
settlement risks. 
Of primary importance for the stability of the whole system is the 
establishment of prudential ratios announced on April 13, 1993. These 
include an 8 percent capital ratio based on risk adjusted assets and off 
balance sheet items; a 30 percent liquidity ratio; and restrictions on 
insider loans, the maximum amount to be lent to one client, etc. 
Moreover, there are minimum EEK capital requirements as well. As do 
other central banks, ВОЕ establishes criteria for being given a license to 
establish a bank. It also has an on-site inspection program as part of its 
overall supervisory responsibilities. 
To directly manage settlement risks, ВОЕ requires that commercial 
banks settle all transactions within 48 hours and that they have sufficient 
balances in their clearing accounts to meet payment obligations. 
ВОЕ has also established procedures for determining whether banks can 
apply for liquidity assistance (from June 15, 1992. This assistance is not 
like the Federal Reserve's discount window. It is more limited than that. 
Banks having difficulty meeting their short term settlement requirements 
and which cannot obtain funds through the interbank market (discussed 
below) can borrow against their required reserves. Thus, as of July 27, 
1993, banks which have concluded a clearing contract with the Bank of 
Estonia are automatically granted settlement credit in case the balance of 
the bank's correspondent account in the BoE falls below the level of 
required reserves. The settlement credit can be used on a maximum of 
five banking days during ten successive banking days. The maximum 
size of the clearing credit was then 20 per cent of the bank's required 
reserves. If the balance of the bank's correspondent account drops below 
the required reserves level on more than five banking days out of the ten 
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successive banking days, the payments from this bank's correspondent 
account are stopped on the next day until a decision of a credit 
commission. The interest rate for credits amounting up to 10 percent of 
the required reserves is 25 percent and for credits amounting to more 
than 10 percent of required reserves is 50 percent. This was amended on 
December 30, 1993. On that date, the terms were liberalized to allow 
maximum borrowing equal to 30% of required reserves and with interest 
rates of 15% for amounts borrowed equal to less than 15% of required 
reserves and rates of 25% for greater amounts. 
The implication of these requirements is that ВОЕ cannot provide 
unlimited liquidity to the banking system in order to prop up weak 
banks. The amount of liquidity that a bank can obtain to handle 
settlement and solvency difficulties is limited to the total reserves of the 
system as obtained through the interbank market and by borrowing on its 
own required reserves while paying a very high interest rate. These 
restrictions plus BOE's rather aggressive actions to impose moritoria and 
eventual bankruptcy on noncomplying banks suggests that the Estonian 
financial and payments systems are quite disciplined. Banks must exhibit 
great care in granting loans and in monitoring their customers because 
there are no doubts but that the failure to do so can ultimately result in 
their bankruptcy. 
There are also terms and eligibility requirements for banks to participate 
in the interbank money market. 
The Estonian Interbank Market 
Since the stuff of interbank deals is excess reserves, this section begins 
with the rules used to determine a banks required reserves. Reserves 
must be held against demand, savings and time deposits in both domestic 
and foreign currency. 1Ъе determination of required reserve levels has 
changed three times over the past two years: on March 31, 1993, April 
15, 1994 and . The March 31, 1993 provision required that "the 
obligatory level of required reserves for the next month is calculated as 
an average of the three 10-day periods of the previous month". This was 
changed to "the required reserves level for the next 10 days must be 
calculated as the average of the end of three preceding months". 
Currently, required reserve levels are based on the average deposit 
balances for the first, tenth and twentieth days of the preceding month. 
The required reserves level for the next month will take place on the 5th 
workday of each month. Throughout the period studied in this paper, 
required reserves were set at 10% of bank deposits. 
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In late 1992, officials at ВОЕ began to notice large holdings in 
correspondent accounts (excess reserves). To put these reserves to more 
productive use, ВОЕ launched a short term money market project in 
January 1993. The objective of this project was to allow banks to sell 
short-term .cash surpluses to the market and also obtain them in the event 
of liquidity problems. In so doing this, it was hoped that a rudimentary 
money market would emerge. 
The early results were somewhat disappointing as commercial banks 
were slow to use to use the market. There were four primary reasons for 
this: 
1. Banks were informed of their end-of-day balance in correspondent 
accounts at ВОЕ only at 5 pm. Lending money before this endan­
gered client payments received after the loan was made because 
banks simply did not know balance. But after 5 pm, banks were 
closed and could not make deals. 
2. Many managers simply felt that large excess reserve balances 
were a sign of a bank's strength. They had developed no under­
standing of opportunity costs. This attitude is a characteristic of 
the transition from the former system and is due to the carryover 
of managers from the old system who have not had much training 
in basic financial principles.' 
3. Banks had internal control systems which limited the money man­
ager's ability to transact in the market. For example, one bank re­
quired its money manager to get the bank president's signature be­
fore completing any transaction. This requirement was eased in 
March 1994. 
4. A more important reason was the mutual mistrust among banks 
regarding each others solvency. As a result, most preferred to keep 
excess reserves in zero interest accounts rather than lend to other 
banks. 
These fears were not unfounded. Shortly after the Monetary Reform was 
initiated, Estonia experienced its first banking crisis. This was related to 
the failure of the Russian Vnesheconombank (Soviet Foreign Economic 
Bank) which led to the freezing of clearing balances of certain Estonian 
banks which were financing trade with Russia. This resulted in the 
restructuring of two banks. Union Baltic Bank and North Estonian Bank, 
Ltd. into North Estonian Bank. At the same, Tartu Commercial Bank 
^ Moreover, Social Bank, which was the largest bank as measured by total assets in 
Estonia, held most deposits of the central government and did not pay any interest 
on them. Consequently, the management felt no incentive to invest these funds in 
interest earning assets and had large amounts of cash and excess reserves. 
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failed due to mismanagement and bad loans. In January and February, 
the licenses of seven banks were not renewed, two banks had their 
licenses revoked and one had a moratorium (the step prior to declaring 
bankruptcy) placed on it. 
To remedy these problems, BoE took two actions: 
1. BOE began to require banks to send money orders of their clients 
to the clearing center by 2 pm. This is called the initial clearing. 
BOE would then electronically transmit to each bank the balance 
of their correspondent accounts by 3 pm. Interbank deals typically 
take place by phone among bank money managers between 3 pm 
and 5 pm although BOE allows 24 hour trading in the market. In 
fact, given the small number of banks in the market, most activity 
is concluded in approximately five minutes. 
2. BOE began to issue short term certificates of deposit with 
100,000 EEK face value and a 28-day maturity. These CDs were 
sold at auction every two weeks. Commercial banks could then 
make deals in the secondary market with these BOE CDs. This ar­
rangement creates virtually risk free interbank loans. Banks can 
sell these CDs back to BOE or can use them as collateral in repo 
deals with other banks. 
The first auction occurred on May 4, 1993. BOE offered EEK 5 million 
of CDs and half were sold that day with the remainder sold on May 5. A 
second auction took place on May 18; 19 bids were made and the entire 
issue promptly sold out. (EEK 10 million were offered). However, 
several large banks did not participate. [6, pp. 36-37]. 
By the spring of 1994, activity in the interbank market was building and 
apparently banks were willing to deal directly with each other and 
without collateralizing their deals. This is evidenced by the fact that 
commercial banks became less interested in BOE's CD auctions and 
would not buy out the entire issue. A factor contributing to this 
imbalance between supply and demand was the fact that BOE began to 
double the amount of CDs offered and held the auctions weekly. After 
some readjustments, the July 1994 auction sold out. 
May 1994 saw some additions to the list of money market securities as 
the city of Tallinn offered EEK 20 million in six month notes (interest 
rate of 10%) and then did so again in June (interest rate of 10.5%). At 
about the same time, other commercial banks began to issue their own 
CDs with varying degrees of success. [3, p. 54-55]. 
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IV. Analysis and Evaluation 
In this section we analyze institutional developments and data trends in 
the Estonian liquidity and payments system to determine the progress 
that has been made since independence in August of 1991. In this 
context, we think of progress as those institutional developments which 
have been put in place to enhance the efficiency and proper functioning 
of the payments system and also certain favorable trends in the behavior 
of conmiercial banks. 
Based on the material discussed in Sections II and III above, we can 
establish the following institutional developments in the Estonian 
financial system: 
1. Abolition of the monobank - specialized bank system to be re­
placed by a central bank and competing commercial banks. Ac­
complished by early 1992. 
2. Consolidation of commercial bank branch accounts into one, uni­
fied system of accounts. Accomplished by central bank action to 
reduce the number of small banks that were branches of the former 
Soviet banks. 
3. Establishment of clearing centers and other institutional arrange­
ments to facilitate interbank payments. Few banks have corre­
spondent accounts with each other and therefore all use the 
Clearing Division of the ВОЕ for settlements. There are plans to 
set up a Clearing Center, which might be independent of the cen­
tral bank. 
4. Replacement of paper based settlement procedures with electronic 
settlement. All settlement is done electronically and the system has 
the capability to clear within 24 hours. There are plans for real 
time settlement of accounts which banks will provide their cus­
tomers for a fee. 
5. Replacement of gross settlement procedures with a net settlement 
procedure. With the improvement of the current system to one 
which allows real time settlement, large value transactions will be 
settled on a net basis. That capability is not currently present. 
(Interview with Vladimir Mihailov, Head of the Clearing Division, 
ВОЕ). 
6. Indications that the central bank is actively engaged in supervising 
and monitoring the system. Briefly, ВОЕ grants operating licenses 
to banks, has established prudential ratios, conducts on-site su­
pervisory visits, has established required reserve ratios and has an 
array of reporting requirements that banks must adhere to. It has 
forced banks which violate its rules into bankruptcy. 
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7. Evidence that the central bank has developed procedures to deal 
with settlement risk. 
This is probably the most crucial institutional development in a 
payments system because it directly addresses issues of systemic risk. 
ВОЕ monitors the banks with regard to the ratios listed above to 
maintain the solvency and stability of the system. Other relevant items 
are that ВОЕ: 
• provides limited liquidity assistance, not in the form of loans 
• does not pay interest on reserves 
• requires settlement within 48 hours 
• restricts the amount of reserves available for interbank lending 
Also based on Section II, we would expect the following trends in data 
related to the payments system: 
1. Reductions in the level and volatility of net float relative to bank 
reserves. 
Figure 1 presents the behavior of the net float (debit float minus credit 
float) to total reserves ratio and compares it to the monthly percentage 
change in total reserves. All data are measured as of the end of the 
month. The volatility of the reserves measure seems to abate somewhat 
in 1994 over 1993. A comparison of the basic statistics f(^r the reserves 











The net float to reserves ratio increases dramatically in the second half 
of 1994, however, with one peak occurring in July and another in 
December. Several factors seem to be at work here. The first is 
continuing payment delays by Social Bank as it goes through its final 
death throes. This was certainly the case in July which was just prior to 
ВОЕ imposing a moratorium on the bank and probably also true in 
December when ВОЕ denied Social Bank further access to its liquidit> 
facility. The second possible explanation is that more banks are delaying 
payments for the full 48 hours allowed them. A third reason is just a 
large increase in the volume of transactions processed through the 
system. Such an increase has steadily occurred over the past few years. 
Data on this trend was not available from ВОЕ. 
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2. Increased activity in the interbank money market. 
Figure 2 shows the time series behavior of the basic money market assets 
available to Estonian commercial banks. Reserves refers to excess 
reserves calculated simply as the difference between total reserves and 
required reserves. Loans refers to the level of interbank loans. Claims are 
claims on foreign banks, predominantly hard-currency deposits in 
German and American correspondent banks. 
After a slow start, activity in the interbank market picks up dramatically 
and peaks in July 1994. During this period, Social Bank was very 
actively borrowing from other banks because of its own liquidity 
problems. In July, for example. Social Bank's borrowing accounted for 
59% of the market's activity. The bank could not satisfy its liquidity 
needs in this market and began to draw upon BOE's liquidity facility. A 
moratorium was declared in August and lifted in September. 
Three facts account for the large drop in interbank activity in August. 
First, Social Bank could no longer access the market. Second, ВОЕ 
allowed banks to count vault cash as satisfying up to 50% of their 
reserve requirement. Thus, liquidity needs dropped dramatically. Third, 
ВОЕ significantly reduced the amount of funds that banks could lend in 
the market. To see this requires a brief explanation of how ВОЕ 
determines daily, commercial bank settlement balances. After the initial 
clearing takes place at 2 pm, ВОЕ calculates two numbers and transmits 
them to the banks. The first number represents the bank's balance on 
account. The second number indicates balances that are owed but which 
paying banks cannot cover because of insufficient balances. This balance 
can arise when a borrowing bank cannot repay its overnight loan by the 1 
pm, next-day deadline. The deficit bank can ask the lending bank for an 
extension on repayment until the next day. Until July 1994, the sum of 
these two amounts, if positive, could be lent in the interbank market. 
After that date, only the first could be lent. The sum total of these two 
changes effectively provided additional liquidity to the system and at the 
same time reduced the amount of reserves available for interbank 
lending at a time when there was substantial risk to the system. 
3. Reductions in excess reserves as a percent of total reserves (reduction 
in reserve ratio - total reserves as a percentage of total deposits). 
Figure 2 also shows a steady decline in the level of excess reserves. This 
is definitely an indicator of increased payments efficiency. Still, as a 
percentage of total reserves, the excess reserves held by Estonian banks 
amounted to 56% December 1994. In developed, western economies this 
excess reserve ratio is less than one percent. 
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To see if there was a relationship between decreases in excess reserves 
and increased interbank activity and increased amounts of foreign 
deposits, a regression was run on the levels of these variables. The 
period included was restricted to October 1993 through December 1994, 
which includes the start date for interbank market activity. The results of 








Both variables display the correct signs, but only the interbank market 
variable is significant. Thus, it seems that the introduction of the 
interbank market is associated with a decline in the excess reserves held 
by the banking system. Changes in foreign deposit balances are related 
to factors other than substitution among money market assets. Some of 
these are the increased amount of international trade activity enjoyed by 
Estonian enterprises and the relatively poor quality of the domestic 
lending market coupled with BOE's monitoring activity and liquidity 
requirements. (Interview with Kaja Kell of ВОЕ). Any conclusions must 
be carefiilly advanced, however, because of the small sample size 
available. 
V. Conclusions 
It appears that the Estonian payments system is suitable for the current 
level of development of the Estonian financial system. We may 
characterize this level as one where significant levels of trade and 
business activities occur but where the financial markets have developed 
in only the most rudimentary fashion. As a result, the Estonian system 
does not have to handle the large volume of large valued transactions 
associated with more developed financial systems. Nevertheless, the 
system quickly developed the institutions necessary for an efficient 
settlement of payments; has adopted procedures by which the central 
bank can manage settlement risk due to either liquidity problems or 
solvency problems; and has made some progress in stabilizing the level 
of float, reducing excess reserves and developing a relatively active 
interbank market. And the ВОЕ, as managers of the system, are planning 
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on introducing in^roved technologies iHiich will make the system ready 
for moce advanced clearing requirantots. 
The distortions in die data associated with Social Bank's liquidity 
inx>blems in 1994 certainly make any conclusions about the "normal" 
functioning of the system ];m>blematic at best. In particular, it is not clear 
\v1iether a more pronounced substitution of interbank loans for excess 
reserves would have happened if Social Bank had not run into 
difßculties. It is also difficult to assess whether this disruption in the 
interbank market effectively reduced the volume of enterprise loans. 
And, whether or not ВОЕ chose the most cost effective way to resolve 
the crisis is a subject of continuing debate. 
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FISCAL PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES 
Robert W.McGee 
This paper discusses some of the fiscal problems faced by any economy 
that is attempting to make the leap from central planning to a market 
economy. Although all economies have fiscal problems, transition 
economies have special problems. Not only must they deal with the 
normal problems faced by a market economy; they must also replace 
major portions of their existing system of public finance with systems 
that are more suited to a market economy at a time when the market 
economy itself is not fully in place. This paper outlines some of the 
problems faced by an economy in transition and suggests approaches and 
solutions. 
All economies have fiscal problems. The tax base is too narrow. Tax 
rates are too high. The system can't collect enough revenue to cover 
government expenditures. The collection and administrative systems are 
too burdensome. There is too much evasion. The rules are not clear. The 
rules are too complex. The system is perceived as being unfair. 
Economies that are in transition from central planning to a market 
system have these problems, too, only for them the problems of 
implementing and administering a system of public finance are much 
more difficult and complex. 
Fiscal Revolution 
Economies in transition do not have the luxury of finetuning their fiscal 
system. Countries that have had a market economy for decades akeady 
have a fiscal system in place that more or less does what it is intended to 
do. Some systems are better than others, but the basic system has been in 
place for a long time. Improvements to the system can be small and 
gradual. Economies in transition need to have a fiscal revolution. Their 
entire system of raising revenue must be changed, and they must find or 
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train people who can administer the new system. A large segment of the 
population must be educated to understand the basics of the new system. 
Business owners have to leam how to keep records in a manner that tax 
officials can understand. Workers must get accustomed to having taxes 
taken out of their paychecks if the fiscal authorities decide to adopt a 
payroll tax. 
Under central planning, where the government owned all the income-
producing assets, there was no need for an income tax or a sales tax. 
Fiscal authorities merely appropriated the surplus they needed from the 
1 
various state-owned businesses and transferred it to the treasury. As 
state enterprises are turned over to the private sector, the government's 
tax base shrinks, and the government's revenue sources are not 
immediately replaced because there is no market-based fiscal system in 
place, at least not in the early stages of transition. As a result, there can 
be a sharp decline in the amount of revenue available to the government. 
Of course, as assets are transferred from the governmental sector to the 
private sector, and as the market takes over functions previously done by 
the state, there is also less need for the government to have revenue. But 
revenue can drop faster than the need for it shrinks, leading to a deficit. 
Some governments offset this deficit by printing money or expanding 
credit, which leads to inflation. The market economy is often blamed for 
the resulting inflation, when in fact the inflation was caused either by 
credit expansion or the printing press, both of which are controlled by 
the government. Attempts to control inflation by instituting price 
controls retard the growth of the market, since the price system is a 
signalling mechanism, and price controls distort the signals being sent, 
resulting in misallocation of resources and a dampening of the incentive 
to invest. 
Lack of Clearly Defined Rules 
When a country's fiscal system changes from one based on central 
planning to a market system, there are no clearly defined rales. New 
rules have to be made, almost instantaneously, and the mles have to be 
disseminated, both to the fiscal authorities, and to the people and 
enterprises that will be taxed. The changes to the fiscal system must also 
be coordinated with other changes that are being made in converting to a 
market economy. To make matters worse, there is no cookbook to guide 
the authorities as they attempt the conversion to a market system. As a 
'мсЮппоп 110-111. 
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result, every country that is attempting the conversion is taking a 
different path. Some methods work better than others and there are 
bound to be mistakes as fiscal and political authorities attempt to lead 
their country into the new system. 
Nobody Knows What the Rules Are 
When new rules are formulated, another problem becomes apparent. No 
one knows what the rules are. The people in positions of authority have 
to be made aware of the new rules as they are made so they can start 
implementing them. Oftentimes, the new rules are not clearly written or 
complete. One reason for this phenomenon is because it is impossible to 
anticipate each and every question that might come up when 
in^lementation is started, especially if the people who wrote the rules 
are unfamiliar with the market system. Even policymakers in countries 
that have had a market system for generations often do not do a good job 
of writing rules on the first attempt. As a result, changes have to be made 
as questions and problems arise. Ideally, a group of experts will first 
consult to determine what changes need to be made before amendments 
to existing rules are issued. But time pressure does not always allow for 
this luxury. In cases where decisions about rule changes have to be made 
rapidly, perhaps one or two agency officials are assigned the task of 
fixing any gaps, inconsistencies or unclear provisions. Because the 
dissemination of knowledge in society is diffused, it is impossible for 
one or two individuals, no matter how intelligent, to be able to construct 
perfect rules, no matter how much time they have to do it. 
Some transition economies are working around the fact that nobody 
knows what the rules are by making private deals with taxpayers. In 
China, for example, a foreign company that wants to establish itself in 
China enters into discussions with local, regional and/or national 
officials to negotiate tax payments. Rather than assessing the tax as a 
percentage of profits, Chinese officials and foreign businesses sometimes 
agree on a flat payment amount regardless of profit levels. The 
advantage of this approach is that everyone knows what the tax liability 
is, thus eliminating some uncertainty. The problem with this approach is 
that western corporate officials are not accustomed to this kind of 
negotiation, and some of them shy away from it. Another problem is that 
corporations are liable for payment of the tax even if they don't make any 
profits, so the tax bite could be more than 100% of profits. A third 
For discussions of this point, see Hayek; Sowell. 
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problem is that Chinese officials sometimes try to squeeze extra revenue 
out of the corporation after the amount of tax Uability has been agreed 
upon. There is no rule of law. Decisions are made by individuals, who 
may be corrupt, and there is no recourse. 
The Rules Change Too Frequently 
Transition economies have a tendency to change tax rules too frequently. 
It is not unusual for the tax rules to change each year, or even more 
frequently for awhile, until the tax authorities settle on a policy that they 
feel comfortable with. This phenomenon of frequent tax law changes is 
not confined to transition economies, however. Western democracies 
engage in this practice, too. In the United States, for example. Congress 
has made significant changes to the tax law almost every year since 
1981. 
While it is generally a good idea to replace bad tax policies with better 
tax policies, problems result when the changes are too frequent. For one 
thing, it is difficult for both government officials and individuals in the 
private sector to keep up with the changes. The time and effort they 
spend learning new tax laws could be better spent creating wealth. 
Frequent changes also have an adverse effect on investment. Frequent 
changes increase investment uncertainty and obscure business planning. 
Investors will hesitate to invest if they don't know what the rules of the 
game will be a year or two down the road. Business people who are 
already in the marketplace also have a difficult time planning for the 
future if they don't know what rules they will be operating under in the 
future. 
Collection Problems 
All governments have some problems collecting taxes. But transition 
economies have an even tougher time because their tax system is new 
and not fiilly in place. There is ample opportunity for taxpayers to evade 
taxes, especially in the case of small businesses or businesses that deal 
primarily in cash. The taxpayers themselves often do not keep records 
that are detailed enough to determine what their tax liability is, 
especially in the case of an income tax that has complex, obscure and 
frequently changing rules. Government officials often do not know that 
certain businesses exist, which makes it impossible to collect the tax 
unless the taxpayers in question volunteer to pay, which is usually not 
the case. 
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Taxes are especially difficult to collect if the citizenry perceives the 
system to be unfair. Dozens of tax collectors in China have gone into the 
countryside to collect taxes never to be seen again. There are widespread 
rumors that the peasants kill them when they try to collect. The Chinese 
tax system is riddled with corruption and local government officials 
sometimes try to collect more than what is due so they can skim some 
revenues off the top to pay for foreign cars and other luxuries. Chinese 
peasants are also upset because they feel that they pay more taxes than 
city people, and they don't see any benefits coming back to them. 
Basic and Strong Distrust of Government 
Another phenomenon that permeates all transition economies is the 
widespread distrust of government. This basic distrust is by no means 
confined to transition economies, however. People in every country have 
a certain distrust of government and government officials. People in 
Switzerland and the United States have perhaps less distrust of 
government than people in Latin America and Eastern Europe, but the 
perception that government is, at times at least, an enemy rather than a 
friend of the people, exists in every society to a certain extent. 
This perception becomes important when government officials attempt 
to collect taxes. Where there is a strong distrust of government, people 
have less tendency to comply with the laws voluntarily. They often feel 
no moral duty to pay taxes to what they consider to be a corrupt 
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government. This feeling, coupled with the absence of a mechanism set 
up to collect tax revenues, makes it especially difficult for governments 
in transition economies to collect the revenue they need to pay for the 
costs of government. 
Tlie Weifare State Mentaiity 
Economies can have fiscal problems not only because they cannot 
collect enough revenue to pay for the costs of government, but also 
because government expenditures are higher than the amount of revenue 
that can easily be collected. In economies that were formerly centrally 
planned, or even in market economies that have relatively large 
governments, there is a tendency for people to think that government 
1 
WuDunn,. 
For a discussion on the moral aspects of tax evasion, see McGee. 
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should provide a wide range of services. Many people, even in market 
economies, think that government should provide them with cradle to 
grave health care. They think that government should provide them and 
their children with free education, pensions, child care, paid leave for 
having children, payments while unemployed (or a guaranteed job for 
life in economies like Russia that formerly had no official 
unemployment). In other words, many people have a welfare state 
mentality. 
The problem is worse in transition economies where government has 
been providing these services for a generation or more. People either do 
not realize that the market can also provide many or all of these services, 
or else they do not want to pay the market rate for these services, in the 
mistaken belief that government can always provide the service more 
cheaply. Numerous privatization studies have shown that the private 
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sector can provide just about any service cheaper than government. 
Even in the United States, where government, at the lower levels at least, 
is perceived as being relatively efficient, these studies have found that 
the private sector can provide equivalent or better services at about 40% 
to 70% of the cost of government. 
The problem is one of perception. People who send their children to 
"free" government schools think they are getting a good deal because 
they do not see the full cost of the service they are receiving. In Newark, 
New Jersey, USA, for example, it costs $10,000 a year to educate one 
high school student in a government school. Parents pay nothing because 
the school expenses are paid for out of tax revenues. Private schools in 
the Newark area can educate a high school student for about $4,000 a 
year. Yet private schools are perceived as being more expensive than 
government schools because parents can see how much it costs for a 
private education - because they have to pay for it - whereas they do not 
see that government schools cost much more because they never see the 
cost figures. They complain that their taxes are too high, but they do not 
see the connection between the size of their tax bills and the cost of 
providing "free" education. 
Another factor that is involved here is that, in the case of private 
education, the only ones who pay for the service are the ones who use it -
- the parents of the students who attend private schools. Government 
schools, on the other hand, are paid for by all taxpayers, whether they 
For summaries of some of these studies, see Fitzgerald; Goodman; Savas; 
Poole; PRIVATIZATION. 
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have any children in school or not. Thus, the cost of providing a "free" 
government school education is spread among the whole taxpaying 
community, whereas the cost of providing a private school education is 
borne entirely by the users of the service. 
As long as people think that they are getting services they do not have to 
pay for, there will be a demand for services. If government attempts to 
provide all the services that are demanded, it naturally will have to 
collect more tax revenues to pay for the services it provides. Thus, the 
welfare state mentality is partially responsible for the fiscal problems 
that all welfare states have. 
Structural Problems 
As a country becomes more developed, its birth rate declines and its 
people live longer because of better nutrition and health сш-е. People in 
many countries are tending to retire at an earlier age, too, at least when 
the government provides pensions and health care services that allow 
them to retire early. 
As a result of this trend, the number of people paying for benefits is 
declining over time while the number of people taking benefits out of the 
system is increasing. Furthermore, as life expectancy increases, people 
take benefits out of the system longer. That, plus government 
inefficiency, is causing the fiscal solvency of many social security and 
health insurance systems to erode. In some cases, where these benefits 
are paid out of payroll taxes, the taxes needed to fiind the system amount 
to more than 50 percent of payroll. As a result, companies are hesitant 
to hire anyone because the wages they pay the employees are only a 
small percentage of their total payroll costs. The result is structural 
underemployment. 
The demographics in each transition economy are different, so the extent 
to which this phenomenon is a structural problem will vary. Countries 
that have a higher birth rate are producing more people who will 
eventually be able to pay into the system to provide for the retirement 
and healüi care costs of their parents and grandparents. Economies with 
lower birth rates will face a crisis sooner. 
In what was the former East Germany, the birthrate declined sharply as 
soon as mothers were no longer paid to stay at home to reuse children. As 
' For the exact percentages for many countries, see Coopers & Lybrand. 
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the (X^iilation ages, thore will be fewer people contributing into the 
system and the babies y/ho were bora during the high birth rate years 
may not be able to receive as much benefits as their parents did as the 
members of the younger generation reach retirement age. In Romania, 
the situation is worse. Under the communist regime, families were 
encouraged, even pressured, to have large families and abortion was 
illegal. Now, there are many young people, but the birth rate has since 
declined markedly, so as these young people ^proach retirement age 
there may not be enough members of the younger generation to pay for 
the benefits the older generation will receive. 
A Choice of Tax Systems 
While much has been said about the extra problems that transition 
economies face, such economies do have at least one distinct advantage 
over their oMer, market-based neighbors. Transition economies can start 
from scratch. They can replace their old system with a new one, whereas 
mature market economies do not have this option. Mature market 
economies cannot revolutionize their tax systems because of inertia. At 
best, all they can hope to do is finetune what has evolved over decades. 
Transition economies can take a more revolutionary approach because 
their old system must be replaced, nearly in toto. Thus, they have the 
advantage of examining existing market economy systems and selecting 
the parts that have worked, while rejecting those parts that have not. As a 
result, it is possible for a transition economy to construct a better fiscal 
system than any that now exist in the mature market economies. They 
need not repeat the mistakes that western economies have made. They 
can bypass the structural deficiencies that western governments are 
burdened with and create systems that are sleek, less complex and 
relatively efficient. In the long-run, after these sleek systems are 
established, transition economies can have a competitive advantage over 
the mature western economies because they will not have the weight of 
the overly complex and inefficient western tax system to burden them. 
Overly burdensome tax systems retard economic growth. Implementing 
less burdensome systems will enhance economic growth. 
Some words of warning are appropriate at this point. As transition 
economies look to the west for guidance regarding their tax system, they 
should not be too quick to adopt western systems. Just because they are 
western does not mean they are good. All western systems of taxation 
can be improved, some more than others. No western tax system should 
be adopted in its entirety. The fiscal authorities in transition economies 
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should select only the parts of western tax systems that have proven their 
worth over time. They should feel free to reject whatever portions of 
western tax systems that have failed, no matter how strongly western tax 
advisors try to convince them. It should be remembered that many of the 
western tax advisors they are consulting with are partly responsible for 
the inefficient and burdensome tax systems they are trying to convince 
emerging economies to adopt. The pressure to adopt western tax systems 
is increased by the fact that many policymakers in transition economies 
want to harmonize their tax policies with the European Union in the 
belief that having a similar tax system will enhance the prospects of 
doing business with the west. Although there is some truth in this idea 
(just as there is some truth in most false ideas), they should not lose sight 
of the fact that a rightly-constructed tax system сгт make them more 
competitive. The goal should be to adopt policies that result in enabling 
them to collect the revenue they need with a minimum of economic 
distortion. That means the system they adopt will have to 4ook much 
different than any western tax system now in existence. The last thing 
they should do is try to mold their tax systems in the image of the west. 
Some Suggestions 
Not all tax systems are alike. Some are much better than others. When 
policymakers look to the west for guidance and advice about tax 
systems, they should be extremely wary about the advice they receive. 
Many of the people who will be giving them advice are the same people 
who caused the problems with the tax systems in the West. There is no 
reason to expect that the advice they are giving to transition economies 
will be any better than the advice they have given to officials in their 
own countries in the past. 
One temptation to be avoided is the belief that a tax system should be 
used as a tool of social engineering. The tax system should have just one 
goal ~ to raise the revenue the government needs to function. It should 
not attempt to alter the behavior of its citizens or to subsidize some 
groups at the expense of the general public. Yet all western tax systems 
incorporate some amount of social engineering into the structure. In the 
United States, for example, there are special subsidies for homeowners, 
families, single individuals, parents, farmers, capital intensive industries, 
and so forth. Other groups are punished, including those who earn 
above-average incomes, those who use alcohol and tobacco, older 
individuals who have part-time jobs, and so forth. Incorporating social 
engineering into the tax system is seen as inherently unfair (if all people 
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are to be treated equally) and they add unnecessary coniypiexity to the 
system. 
A tax system that does not punish capital investment is critical for a 
transition economy. Transitional economies have had their capital base 
eroded by decades of central planning. In many cases, the capital base 
that remains needs to be modernized. In some cases, capital assets need 
to be replaced. There is a shortage of domestic capital, and whatever 
domestic capital that does exist can be sent out of the country if the tax 
system is too unfriendly. A tax system can also discourage foreigners 
from investing their capital in the domestic economy if tax rates are 
punitive or if there are exchange controls that restrict the movement of 
capital. Policymakers who want to attract foreign capital and keep 
domestic capital within its borders must adopt tax policies that are more 
attractive to investors than the policies of other countries. If they don't, 
they will not be able to attract the capital they need for economic growth. 
Two major, and often competing sources of revenue are the income tax 
and some form of consumption tax. There are benefits and dangers to 
either approach. Furthermore, these two approaches are not mutually 
exclusive. A country can, and often does, resort to both methods to raise 
revenue. One advantage of using both approaches is that it enables rates 
to be lower, provided spending does not increase to absorb whatever is 
collected. The problem with using both an income and a consumption 
tax is that spending does have a very strong tendency to rise to match 
whatever level of revenue is collected. In countries that have both taxes, 
taxpayers pay more in total taxes than in countries where there is only 
one tax. Thus, more money is drained out of the private sector, the sector 
that produces economic growth. 
If policymakers want to limit the amount of government spending, it 
would be better to have either just an income tax or just a consumption 
tax. That way, the government will be able to reach into just one pocket 
instead of two, and more money will be left in the private sector, which 
is where real economic growth lies. With only a single tax, taxpayers 
will start screaming if rates get too high, which acts as a governor on the 
system. With both a consumption tax and an income tax, the rates of 
each can be kept low enough that this screaming phenomenon is never 
triggered, which may come as good news to government officials, but a 
double tax would be harmful to taxpayers, since they will be able to keep 
a lesser percentage of their money if government has its hands in two 
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pockets instead of one. If government is seen as the servant of the people 
and not the master, it is not appropriate for government officials to 
attempt to fleece the taxpayers for all they can extract. 
Of the two approaches — income taxation and consumption taxation -
the consumption tax is to be preferred. There are several major problems 
with the income tax. For one, it dampens the incentive to work hard and 
produce wealth, since a portion of whatever is earned will be taken 
away, thus retarding economic growth. Another negative aspect of 
income taxation, periis^s less visible but more in^ortant, is the adverse 
effect an income tax has on human rights. In the United States, for 
ехапф1е, tax officials can confiscate property and sell it to liquidate tax 
liabilities that may not even exist. Homes can be invaded, searched, 
confiscated and even sold with little or no due process of law, and 
taxpayers have little recourse. Thus, the system invites abuse. Taxpayers' 
privacy can be invaded and rights violated at the discretion of the 
Internal Revenue Service. 
These problems are practically nonexistent with a consun^tion tax 
because the tax is not based on income. So there is no need for IRS 
officials to break into homes and confiscate the records of private 
individuals to attempt to prove that income has been hidden. 
Consu  tion taxes are assessed at the business level, so individuals' 
human rights stand less chance of being disparaged. 
Some consumption taxes are better than others. The value-added tax 
(VAT), for ехапфк, is assessed at each stage of production. The tax is 
passed on to the ultimate consumer in the form of higher prices, so it is 
3 
ultimately the consumer who pays the VAT. 
There are several problems with the VAT. For one, the tax is hidden, 
since it is passed on to the consumer, who does not know how much of 
the purchase price is attributable to the cost of the product and how 
* Advocates of a single-rate flat tax have said that the civil rights abuses inherent 
in the current income tax system could be reduced by implementation of a flat 
tax, since the possibility of evasion would be curtailed. But the danger would 
not be eliminated. For a discussion on the merits of a flat-tax, see Hall and 
Rabushka. 
2 
For some horror stories revealing how tax officials in the USA have abused 
their power and trampled on the rights of citizens, see Hansen; Bumham. 
' For discussions on the merits and detriments of the various kinds of consump­
tion taxes, see OECD; Weidenbaum, Raboy and Christian; McLure. 
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much to the tax. Visible taxes are to be preferred to hidden taxes because 
taxpayCTS should know vviiat they are paying for government. The cost 
^ould not be hidden from them, yet it is hidden if the consumption tax 
takes the form of a VAT. Another problem with the VAT is that it takes 
an army Ы accountants to administer the tax and calculate what 
employers at various stages of production owe. These people could be 
better employed at some activity that creates wealth. 
Both of these problemis can be avoided by a consumption tax that is 
assessed only at the retail level. Such a tax would basically be a national 
sales tax. Consumers would know precisely what portion of the product's 
purchase price is attributable to taxes because they would pay it up front 
to the seller, who would then remit it to the tax authorities. And since the 
tax would be co  uted only once, it would not be necessary to hire an 
army of accountants to compute the tax liability at each stage of 
production. 
Payroll taxes to pay for pensions constitute a major tax in most mature 
economies. As previously mentioned, social security taxes can constitute 
more than 50% of payroll costs, thus dampening the incentive to hire 
new employees, since the total cost of hiring a new employee includes 
not only wages but the cost of making social security payments. That, 
coupled with the fact that the social security system is not set up as a 
trust fimd, but rather as a means of transferring wealth from present 
workers to retired workers, makes the present social security system 
especially undesirable for any transitional economy that needs to 
accumulate capital to fuel economic growth. 
The social security system should be privatized. Peru has done it and a 
number of other countries are looking into the possibility. There are 
several advantages to having a private social security system. For one, 
individuals would have a vested right to a pension. Under the present 
system, they must depend on government for their social security 
pensions. Under a private system, the money would be set aside for them 
in private investments, earning interest and growing with each passing 
year. There would no longer be a need to depend on government, and the 
younger generation would no longer be forced to pay for someone else's 
retirement. They would be able to set aside funds to pay for their own 
retirement rather than being exploited by the older generation. 
Another advantage of a privatized system is that the funds collected 
would be invested and would accumulate, rather than being immediately 
transferred to someone else, who would then spend the money. Over the 
course of a generation, a vast amount of capital would be accumulated, 
which would provide the funds needed to fuel economic growth. Under 
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the present system this pool of funds does not exist and cannot come into 
existence. 
One criticism of a privatized system has been "what do we do with the 
people presently receiving benefits?" This is a valid question. Those 
presently receiving benefits from the system are not paying into the 
system any longer. If the younger, presently working generation were 
allowed to make their payments into a private pension fund instead of 
the present social security system, there would be no money available for 
those who are already retired. 
But such is not necessarily the case. Most transition economies are also 
in the process of selling off state assets as they privatize their economies. 
If the proceeds from these asset sales were placed into private pension 
plans, the proceeds could be used to support the people who are now 
drawing social security benefits. Transition economies that have 
buildings, factories and other state ente rises, minerals and forestlands 
could sell them and have more than enough to fiind a privatized social 
security system. 
Voluntary forms of raising revenue are to be preferred over coercive 
means. The income tax is highly coercive. Any kind of income tax 
invites abuses. Consumption taxes are also coercive because they, too, 
take people's property without their consent. But they are usually viewed 
as less coercive than an income tax. Yet they are both coercive means of 
raising revenue. 
There are at least two ways for governments to raise revenue without 
resorting to coercion ~ user fees and lotteries. If the goal is to minimize 
the amount of coercion in society, one way to approach that goal is to 
make full use of noncoercive means of raising revenue whenever 
possible. No one is forced to purchase a lottery ticket. Lotteries are 
completely free of coercion. And they can raise a large amount of 
revenue. 
User fees can be implemented in a number of ways. Those who use the 
government school system could be assessed a fee. Those who use other 
government property, such as roads, parks, museums, and so forth could 
also be charged a fee as a condition of using govenmient assets. In the 
case of roads, the user fee could be added to the price of gasoline, so 
there would be no need to have toll collectors at the end of each street. 
User fees are seen as one of the most fair means of raising revenue 
because only those who benefit by using the service have to pay for it. 
Those who don't use the service are not forced to pay to subsidize 
someone else's use. 
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Policymakers must not forget the other side of the equation ~ spending. 
Any government must raise the funds needed to pay for government 
services, but determining how to raise the fimds is only part of the 
solution. One must also determine how much is needed. That means 
spending will have to be controlled. If a goal is to keep tax rates low, it 
will also be necessary to keep government expenditures at a level that 
will permit rates to be low. One cannot have high spending and low 
taxes without resorting to deficit financing or printing more money, both 
of which have highly negative effects on the economy. 
It is not possible to solve all of a transitional economy's fiscal problems 
within the space of a short paper. However, once the major problems 
have been identified and a few solutions hinted at, it may be possible to 
make some progress in that direction. 
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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENT FEATURES OF 




Successful run of business depends on vitality and ability of the 
management to prepare and manage the financial desicions. An entire 
accounting system of enterprise is a prerequisite for objective desicions 
and a tool for introduction of accounting reform in practice. To 
introduce the present situation of management accounting process in the 
Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania -.earlier as parts of the 
Soviet Union, we should take into consideration some historical aspects^ 
which have still a great impact on the present accounting practice. 
Present stage of management accounting in Estonia is influenced by 
following featuies from the past: 
• Long-term isolation from market economy and development of 
economic thought (due to the restricted cooperation with econo­
mists from market economy countries); 
• During the Soviet era the main objective for ente rise managers 
was the organizing of fulfillment of manufacturing plans designed 
by central ministries; 
• In the period of centrally planned economy the predominant pur­
poses of accounting were the following; 
* centralized control over the achievements of plan targets 
through the economic use of resources; 
* protection of socialist property. 
During the Soviet era and also during the last years company accountants 
were mainly regarded as book-keepers and their prime responsibility was 
to ensure that accounting was compiled with appropriate laws and 
regulations. The accountants were generally not involved in desicion 
making or in monitoring profitability and budgets. As accounting was 
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and in many еШефпзез still is not a management tool, the responsibility, 
orientation in market circumstances and ability to prepare or to make 
financial desicions are not the main features of an accountant at large. 
Ability to folfill the requirements and commands of upper manager were 
more important characteristics. Accounting is still a determinated system 
and consequently subjective elements are removed from accounting 
function. The accountant was and in many enterprises still is accustomed 
to rely upon detailed instructions and guidance in all aspects. Rapid 
changes in business environment (growing competitions, development of 
marketing strategies of corporations etc.) transform the requirements for 
company accounting system and accounting profession. 
I ACCOUNTING ENVIRONMENT 
Need for the conscious shaping of business targets and results and 
system of its implementation expands the scope of accounting in practice 
and lays emphasis on the role and responsibility of chief accountant and 
financial director in the preparation of financial desicions. In the process 
of transformation of book- keeping systems to accounting systems we 
notice a certain progress, mainly through the changes in state of mind. 
The first step towards the formation of accounting environment of 
market economy was made through Estonian Accounting Act in 1991. 
The introduction of subjective elements (depreciation rates, inventory 
valuation methods etc. decided by enterprises) in the accounting practice 
and formation of particular accounting policy is a big change of 
philosophy. The change from cash-basis accounting to accrual-basis 
accounting, the introduction of some important (unfortunately, not all, 
but proceeding from particular circumstances, it's also intelligible) 
underlying accounting principles - realization principle, matching 
principle, historical cost principle - and also inter-relation between the 
various elements of the financial statements has posed problems for a 
large number of accountants. The next step of accounting reform, 
corresponding to the Estonian Accounting Law since 1995, consists of 
the following main items: 
1) introduction of remaining international underlying principles, rec­
ommended in International Accounting Standards (IAS) and in 4-
th EC Company Law Directive, 
2) two formats of Income Statement and 
3) other accounting elements. It will put even greater demands on the 
profession. 
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Since the adoption of Accounting Act in 1991 till the enforcement of 
Accounting Law in 1995 the main issues and practical needs in every­
day operating of accounting departments in companies have been 
changed and developed to be more conceptual. The evolution of 
accounting ^eld in Estonian ente rises can be divided into the following 
large stages: 
I Transition from cash-basis accounting, used in centrally planned 
economy, to accrual-basis accounting, implementation of international 
accounting principles, mentioned above, and recording and posting the 
transactions in conformity with this transition; also compiling annual 
accounts (balance sheet, income statement and statement of changes in 
financial position) according to accrual-basis principles; 
П Implementation of Financial Statement Analysis methods; 
Ш Separation of Taxation field (tax return treatments and presentation 
requirements) from Accounting; 
rV Producing a familiarity with a whole complex of international 
accounting principles; 
V Introduction of internal accounting system, e.g. in the area of cost and 
managerial accounting, through the solution of practical tasks. The main 
emphases are undertaken in such important areas of practice as 
budgeting, cost-volume-profit analysis, cost allocation etc. 
As we see, the main direction is developing from single to general, 
concerning as financial as managerial accounting. In different companies 
the stages, mentioned above, are developing in parallel. 
The questioning carried out among administrative staff (general 
directors, financial directors, chief accountants etc.) of more than eighty 
Estonian firms in spring 1994 demonstrated that only in 3% of 
ente rises the accounting emphasis as "hot points" has remained on the 
compiling of financial statements. For 75% of firms it has removed to 
the area of cost and managerial accounting. Financial statement analysis 
served as target in 22% of the total amount of firms. 
In circumstances of expanding competition the role of accounting and 
accountant in the process of preparation the financial decisions will 
rapidly become more important.. But some obstacles are making it more 
difficult to ensure mentioned direction: 
1) Undeterminated allocation of responsibilities in financial activities 
in companies, principally between financial directors and chief ac­
countants; 
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2) Continuously changing and improving national business legisla­
tion. As a result of that the accounting departments have to rear­
range the operating and concentrate often on particular details. In 
such conditions it is difficult to lay stress on design of the account­
ing information system. Still we can observe sufficient progress in 
this item during last three-four years. 
The financial accounting framework will be fixed by accounting 
legislation. The Estonian Accounting Law will help the integration of 
Estonia into international economic environment. Additional to the 
formation of legal accounting framework according to the market 
economy, a new accounting law has essential role in the process of 
transformation of state of mind in the field of accounting, including also 
some initial positions for cost and management accounting. The 
implementation of the second format (cost by fimctions) of Income 
Statement will change the widely distributed understanding about the 
substance and formation of product unit cost. Estonian Accounting Law 
specifies that selling expenses, administrative expenses, rese»x:h and 
development expenses are period expenses. These е^фепвез are not 
included in the values of inventories and are therefore not part of cost of 
goods sold in Income Statement second format and following in product 
unit cost. It is a conceptual difference in comparison with the total cost 
methods used in centrally planned economy. 
II MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING PRACTICE 
The particular financial results, expressed in financial statements are 
shaped through the management accounting systems and based on 
achievement, coordination and reasonability of Budgets. In the period of 
centrally planned economy, cost and management accounting had not 
been treated as an independent branch of accounting but only as an 
integral part of unitary financial accounting. Therefore, it is difficult to 
speak about real management accounting in Estonia yet, although cost 
accounting and cost analysis were and are practiced extensively, but 
mostly by administrators and technocrats. Conceptual changes in this 
field are also necessary. 
Management accounting is primarily concerned with providing 
information to internal managers who are charged with planning and 
controlling the operations of the firm and making a variety of 
management decisions. As it is used internally, management accounting 
is not regulated by legal requirements and it is not a subject to 
Accounting Law. For a large number of accountants it has posed 
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problems, because they are used to operate according to legal 
instructions. The process of development and implementation of 
management accounting system in co  anies seems to be a con^etition 
between the traditional customs and knowledge from centrally planned 
economy, from one side, and needs for solutions of practical tasks in 
every-day management operating. 
The most conceptual initial problems concern the following aspects; 
1) Undefined primary goals of сопфапу. Often the top-managers do 
not fix the particular goals for particular time-periods (market 
segment to be achieved, expansion of market through new regions 
etc.). It concerns both strategic and operative line. Consequently, 
it is difficult to fix targets also for lower level of management. As 
a result, the company business figures will be formed by chance 
and subjective factors; 
2) The budgeting systems do not constitute a composite whole. The 
internal coordination within the planning and control system is in 
most cases lacking. The different parts of budgeting process 
would be carried out separately without general coordination be­
tween different activities and plans. It means that the submits do 
not work as one cohesive unit and company's overall objectives 
cannot be met. Nevertheless, in our questioning 17% of adminis­
trators saw the main problem in drawing up and coordinating of 
operating and financial plans. Unfortunately, many manufacturing 
finns lay their emphasis on manufacturing process and do not pay 
enough attention on sales; 
3) Undeterminated cost concepts. Accounting by cost elements will 
be, to a great extent, too unilateral to handle. In practice, cost will 
be classified on the basis of formats of Income Statement (cost by 
types, cost by functions). Costs will be much less classified by 
their behavior in accordance with changes in activity (variable 
costs, fixed costs, mixed costs), by traceability to a particular ob­
ject of costing (direct costing, indirect costing) or by their rele­
vance to control (controllable and noncontrollable costs). It 
complicates the implementation of cost-volume-profit analysis 
into the financial management practice. 
Even if the cost-volume-profit analysis is used in the company practice, 
it will be limited to break-even analysis and determination of break-even 
sales. Such necessary applications in profit planning and short-term 
decision making as "what-if scenarios will be used only in single 
enterprises. These initial aspects for management accounting system 
have direct negative impact on the following items. Detailed 
classification of costs in practice and apprehension of their behavior at 
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different activity level will serve as objective basement for break-even 
analysis, cost analysis for cost centers and segmental cost allocation. 
ill COST ALLOCATION 
The problem of objective allocating costs to various products, divisions, 
departments etc. becomes more and more essential. In our questioning 
about 24% of administrators pointed out the cost allocation as the main 
problem-area in cost and management accounting. 
ALLOCATION TO PRODUCTS. The cost allocation between products 
depends on the cost classification and cost calculation methods. 
Different categories of expenses, as mentioned above, are mainly 
classified according to the formats of Income Statement For example, in 
manufacturing, costs are often classified as follows: 
• Materials and supplies, 
• Purchased inventories, 
• Fuel and energy for technological purposes, 
• Direct labor, 
• Indirect labor, 
• Social security deductions, 
• Maintenance of equipment, 
• General manufacturing overhead, 
• Nonproduction overhead, 
• General overhead etc. 
The first five items consitute direct cost. All other costs are indirect 
costs. The methods of calculating cost per unit used today in Estonia are 
very close to them, used in centrally planned economy. In the Soviet 
Union the full cost principle (including almost all costs) has been 
adopted officially. This method is still very widely used by accounting 
departments of the companies of independent (since 1991) Estonia, By 
this method, indirect costs are allocated to direct costs in proportion to 
one of the basis, usually direct labor. As a result, costs are higher for 
labor-intensive products and lower for technology and capital-intensive 
products. This unified method could be convenient for officers of minis­
tries to distribute the resources in Soviet era, but unmanageable by 
company managers in Estonia today. 
ALLOCATION TO DIVISIONS, During the last years the cost allocat­
ing to divisions was developed in the following direction: 
1) Unitary internal cost accounting. The nonmanufacturing direct and 
indirect costs will allocate to manufacturing departments in pro­
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portion to one of the plant-wide or departmental rate basis, usually 
direct labor, labor hour or machine hour basis. 
2) Internal cost accounting based on transfer prices. According to 
this approach the goods and services from different departments 
are valued at transfer prices. The transfer price consists of raw 
product cost, manufacturing or operating costs and planned 
"profit" of the department. The "profit" is a markup to planned or 
norm costs of the manufacturing or operating department. At the 
end of the accounting period will be computed the internal "profit" 
for each structural unit. The amount of profit determines the sala­
ries of the employees. The problem is that internal accounting be­
comes somewhat independent from the operations of the overall 
companies. Quite frequently, the total amount of internal "profits" 
exceeds the amount of the company's profit. 
3) Segmental allocation through the contribution-margin income 
statement. This approach is used only in a small number of enter­
prises because it depends on how the costs are classified according 
to their behavior. As it was mentioned above, such approach to 
cost classification is not widely used. 
iV ORGANIZATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL PREREQUISITES 
The design of systematic management accounting system in Estonian 
companies requires some organizational and educational prerequisites to 
be achieved. Among the organizational aspects we would like to point 
out the following ones: 
1) Redesign of organizational structure of management. Quite fre­
quently, some financial tasks are handled in parallel. Particular fi­
nancial responsibilities are also not fixed, which makes the im­
plementation of responsibility accounting quite complicated. 
2) A number of accounting software packages are oriented just for 
compiling the financial statements. The packages do not include 
the tools to fix some necessary items, for example, the cost and 
revenue centers, for following cost and management accounting. 
The introduction of a complex accounting system in Estonian 
companies, involving both financial and management accounting, re­
quires a complex and systematic approach on top-management level. 
Unfortunately, we can meet an integral and entire approach to the 
organizational, managerial and accounting structure (departementali-
zation) relatively rarely. Only 7% of the firms, that have been taking part 
in our questioning, considered it to be imparative to redesign companies 
accounting system. 
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Problematic areas mentioned above set up particular conceptual 
requirements on the accounting training and retraining organized for 
practioners. The main objectives of retraining process to be achieved are 
the following: 
1. Sy^tematics and comprehensiveness of accounting education; 
2. Transition from stereotypes of central planned economy to the 
state of mind and skolls used in market economy; 
3. Connection with current situation in accounting environment and 
practical demand - to build the bridge between former accounting 
environment to the new one; 
4. Incorporation into the international accounting environment. 
All these items have to be taken into consideration simultaneously. 
The most convenient and useful organizational form for retraining is so 
called "on-the-job training", when the seminars would be held by 
experienced academicians or practitioners of the firms. These seminars 
mainly concentrate on conceptual and practical questions of management 
and cost accounting. 
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INVESTMENTS, CAPITAL MARKET AND COST 
OF CAPITAL IN ESTONIA 
Kaia Klink, Vambola Raudsepp, Danel Tuusis 
I Introduction 
Problems concerned with the investments have many aspects. We have 
tackled only the investment environment, investing in securities and the 
cost of capital in Estonia in this research paper. 
Estonia is an excellent investment area for small, medium and large 
businesses. Estonia has a favourable investment climate and a sutable 
place for the following reasons: «favourable geographical position on the 
Baltic Sea, good communication with East and West; «relatively stable 
political and economic situation (recovery from the production decline 
and growing GDP); «long traditions of industrial production, high 
educational level, European cultural environment, skilled labour; »a 
strong energy base, many local mineral and forest recources; »relatively 
good infrastructure (ports, roads, telecommunications, building 
capacities); »establishment of enterprices has been made as simple as 
possible; »foreign investors have the unrestricted legal right to own land 
or assets, also the same rights and liabilities as Estonian citizens or legal 
entities. 
II The Environment of Investments in Estonia 
Estonia needs hundreds of billions of kroons to modernize its industry, 
agriculture, trade, transport, housing economy, social- and technical 
infrastructure. The local investment resources are very limited and more 
international funding is needed, thus it is important to attract as many 
investments as possible. 
The Estonian parliament adopted the Foreign Investment Law on 
10 September 1991 and since then has been carrying out liberal policies 
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of foreign investments. The Estonian environment is especially 
favourable for foreign investments as the country's economic 
development is geared to the open market system. Foreign investors have 
no restrictions for making investments.The fourth part of the Foreign 
Investment Law stipulates that the Republic of Estonia provides full 
political guarantees for foreign investments, and according to the law, no 
restrictions can be imposed on enterprises operating on foreign capital. 
All foreign investments into Estonia get fiill legitimate guarantees 
against attempts to nationalize, forcibly appropriate or confiscate any 
investments made by any citizen or company abroad. 
The country has a relatively highly developed production potential, with 
the high share of industry - 32, 6% of the working age population was 
engaged in this branch. The recovery from the decline and active 
privatization creates preconditions for the growth of investments, 
including foreign investments. 
The main features to attract foreign investors are; »lower priced but at 
the same time relatively qualifyed (highly-skilled) working power (may 
be also the absence of acceptable activity of trade unions); «favourable 
geografical position between Riga and St. Petersburg and also icefree 
ports with the outlet by sea to Finland, Sweden and other countries; 
•Estonian national currency is freely convertible; »relatively low 
production costs; »existence of the new and rapidly developing market 
(also the market in the East); »it is possible to use ahready existing 
production power; »relatively well-developed telecommunications 
network (including mobile phone facilities) and infrastructure ( the 
network of roads); »European environment of culture; »stable economic 
growth and well-balanced political developments in and from the 
country; »the existence of many natural resources. 
Besides, foreign companies have a possibility to penetrate into the 
enormous Russian market more securely with the help of Estonian firms, 
who have already business experience with Russians. 
But there are also some possibilities to be mentioned, as they may cause 
risks: »incomplete legislation; »nonfavourable taxation policies; »some 
restrictions When buying land (the absence of real estate market); 
»volatile inflation rate; »long break-even period of projects; »low equity 
of local banks, enabling them to invest into small projects; »in addition 
there is a need to tighten security in the country and can consolidate the 
cooperation with Latvia and Lithuania. 
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The Estonian's securities market also needs to be reconstructed in order 
to attract both Estonian and foreign portfolio. Firstly, today invesments 
are made directly to the companies. Secondly, many local investors 
prefer making investments abroad. The reliable securities market in 
Estonia can attract them invest locally. 
The Agency for Estonian Foreign Investments into Estonia came into 
operation in the spring 1994 with the aim to attract foreign investors to 
make direct investments into Estonian economy. Up to now the main 
investors to Estonia are from Finland, Sweden, Russia, Denmark and 
Germany. For other countries (for example the USA) Estonian's 
potential is too small because of the small market. 
Ill Foreign Investments analysis In Estonia in 1994 
Last year 3,2 billion kroons of foreign capital was invested into the 
Estonian economy. The total amount of investments increased in 1994 
by almost twofold as compared with 1993. Of the total 2,2 billion kroons 
was invested into the capital stock of new and already operating 
ente rises. 846 million kroons were invested in new and 1,3 billion in 
existing ente rises. Investors are interested in increasing their capital in 
Estonia rather than repatriate profit. 
The number of new ente rises with foreign partnership established in 
1994 was 1451. The largest amount of foreign capital invested into the 
capital stock came from Russia (35 million DEM or 26%), Finland 
(14,9 million or DEM 11, 2%) and Sweden (12,6 million DEM or 
9,6%). The outflow of Estonian direct investments into foreign countries 
was 3,6 million DEM. 
Since Estonia regained independence 65 million DEM worth of foreign 
capital has been invested into the capital stock of new and operating 
ente rises in Estonia. According to the data: of the Estonian Ente rise 
Register, as of 1 January the largest number of firms with foreign 
partnership established were with Finnish firms (52,2% of the firms and 
22% of the foreign capital). Next came Russia (respectively 12,5 and 
12,2%), Sweden (11,1 and 27,6%), Germany (4,3 and 4%) and the 
United States (3,8 and 7,3%). 
Last year foreign investors preferred to invest into Estonian industry 
(91,5 million DEM), trade (8,6 million DEM) and business services, 
transport and communications, hotels and restaurants, agricultural 
ente rices and building. 
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According to the Estonian Enterprise Register the largest foreign 
investments were made into CEOCIL (60 million DEM, Russia and the 
former Yugoslavia, raw materials for detergents), Eesti Telefon 
(22,5 million DEM, Sweden, communications). Eesti Tubakas 
(15 million DEM, Sweden , tobacco products), Kunda-Nordic Tsement 
(15 million DEM, Finland, cement). Eesti Coca-Cola Joogid (9,4 millon 
DEM, Austria, soft drinks) NTTROFERT (7,5 millon DEM, Russia, 
cemicals), Pakterminal (4,4 million DEM, Netherlands, warehousing 
services), Leibur (3,8 million DEM, Finland and Sweden, bakery), 
Põltsamaa Felix (3,8 million DEM, Sweden, processing of fruit and 
vegetables). 
The bulk of the last year's foreign investments went as previously into 
Tallinn and Haiju County (158,4 million DEM). May be, because the 
majority of Estonia's industry is concentrated in those areas and the 
wages and salaries of people are well above average there. Next came 
the town of Kohtla-Järve (8,8 million DEM), Jõgeva County (3,9 million 
DEM), the town of Narva and Võru County (both 2,5 million DEM). 
IV Estonian capital market 
The comer-stone for Estonian capital market was the law of securities' 
market in June, 1993. Despite that fact first issues had been done akeady 
in 1992. 
The law of securities' market and establishment of new institutions -
specially after the passing the statute of investment fiinds in Aug. 1994 -
has been caused many new issues and has been raised activity on capital 
market dramatically. 
Since Jan, 1995, 24 issues were registred in Estonia, the structure of these 
issues is as following: 
Estonian government bonds 300 ООО ООО 
local govenmient bonds 75 ООО ООО 
corporate bonds 40 ООО ООО 
bonds of financial institutions 41 ООО ООО 
corporates' common stocks 109 924 470 
stocks of investment fimds 152 ООО ООО 
preferred stocks 38 ООО ООО 
mutual fiinds' units 191 ООО ООО 
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Main activity in capital market is given by companies' bonds and 
governments' bonds. All these issues are quite short-run (2...5 years). 
Amount of loans per issuer are also above average loans' amounts - by 
these securities' issuers have reached cheaper loan up to 4%. Issuers 
normally have low rate of debts - around 50..60% - and sufficient 
pledges. These securities are hold mainly by banks. Due to the high face 
value - up to 10,000 kroone - these securities are not traded in open 
secondary market. 
The market for stocks is also quite active. Successful offering have 
achieved by those investors, who already have some results and 
experiences in business - mainly they have tried to capitalize their 
expansion through the open market. Other group of firms, which are 
smaller and not so well-known, have difficulties to capitalize themselves 
through the open market. Widely used strategy is to sell off stocks before 
the registration of issue - this strategy gives for issuer 100% of quarantee 
to sell fixed amount with certain costs. As our personal experienses have 
showed, only every tenth small company have got investors enough to 
register issue and to public themselves. Even that these issues are usually 
hold by banks and by few companies and are not traded actively in the 
secondary market. 
Interesting group on that field are stocks of investment fimds - closed-
end fiinds. Since April 20, 1995, three investment funds have got 
required licencies and have completed their first public issues. Success 
of these issues can be explained by the fact, that these issues have been 
quite proper to have good liquidity in the secondary market - big issues, 
low face values, many companies and persons have bought these 
securities. Important fact is that two of these funds are privatization-
investment fimds, they offer good opportunity for private persons to 
diversify their savings and vouchers. 
Turnover of the secondary market in 1994 was around 1,000,000,000 
kroone, which was the highest in Baltic States. 
Most tradeable and liquid sequrities have been privatization-vouchers on 
the form of electronic deposit on accounts of special register. At the 
beginning of April 3 ООО ООО ООО voucher-kroones have been deposited. 
Unlike Russian or Checz or Polish privatization systems privatization-
vouchers are given to compensate nationalised property in 1940, 1944 
and to compensate unpaid salary during the soviet time. The owner of 
these vouchers can privatize land, apartments and some state firms or 
part of these. Since Aug 1994 up to April, 1995, turnover of these 
vouchers has been 1,243,094,000 voucher-kroones. 
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Some researches have been done to explain the nature of the Estonian 
securities market. Instruments in capital market are not related with 
instruments in money market. It can be explained by excessive liquidity 
assets of Estonian banks and non-accessibility to money market 
instruments by other investors. Banks have strict restrictions given by the 
law to keep liquidity and to weight riskiness of each asset on their 
balance. It has caused the effect of overheating in Estonian capital 
market - financial institutions do not care of interest payments and do not 
evaluate properly riskiness of capital instruments. 
We have recently done some researches to enlighten the nature of the 
vouchers' market in Estonia. Due to convenient conditions and the 
structure of investors, results can be generalized to all securities market. 
The research was concentreated on the structure of the market 
information and how investors process information. The main difference 
of investment models is the assumption concerning the amount of 
information conveyed by price and what information sets traders base 
portfolio decision. 
Results of the research strongly support the noisy rational expectations 
model. This implies that there is considerable noise in the market, but 
not enough to dilute the information contenet of prices completely. 
Results of this research can be interpretated as the fact, that in Estonian 
securities market stable and trusty information set to evaluate public 
firms and securities has not been formed yet. Remarkable is also big 
variation of price changes and price-marginal changes on different 
period of the time. This shows differences in expectations and using 
information among traders. 
We have to stress again that fact - the basis of the research was only the 
market of vouchers in Estonia. 
By these results Estonian securities market does not differ from the 
securities markets of other states of the world. 
The behaviour of the capital market is following the same pattern as 
capital markets in other states. The main difference between the capital 
market in Estonia žind other capital markets is the participation of foreign 
capital. There is many explanations for that and the future of the 
Estonian capital market will be strongly influenced by the inflow of 
foreign capital into that part of the economy. 
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V Cost of Capital 
At present the interest rates on bank loans for Estonian firms are 25 % to 
even 40 %. Unfortunately this fact is true - the demand for loans is far 
greater than supply. Only the specialists of finance understand the meaning 
of this fact. Estonian politicians and financial directors of firms, on the 
other hand, have apparently not understood it. 
Estonian firms are underfinanced and it is almost impossible to find any 
other source of capital besides bank loans, >^ose minimum price 
according to the post-tax basis is 35% x (l-0,26)=25,6%. Would it be 
possible to accept profitable projects taking into account the above 
mentioned level of coital cost? Certainly not, the firms will go bankrupt in 
the nearest future. According to business theory the firms are not able to 
survive in these conditions, but the Estonian firms still exist 
Besides questions about firms based on domestic capital, many questions 
arise about the firms with foreign C£ ital. 
According to the data from 1 October, 1994, the number of firms with 
Finnish capital is the greatest (4,190 .firms with the foreign capital amount 
of 827,000,000 EEK), the next biggest share belongs to Russian firms 
(979 firms with 473,0(X),000 EEK), then come Sweden (875 firms with 
1,051,000,000), Germany (319 and 126,000,000) and the USA (287 and 
276,000 EEK). The greatest share of foreign investment overall capacity 
belongs to Sweden (1,051,000,000 EEK). 
But at the same time it is very surprising that we do not know anything 
about the cost of inflowing capital. It seems that nobody pays attention to 
this cost. Still, during the last nine months 1.3 billion kroons of foreign 
capital have been invested into new and already existing enterprises. 
Foreign investment allocation is also quite interesting in Estonia. Foreign 
investors prefer the following branches of economy: wholesaling and 
retailing, transport, storing and communication, while industry is somehow 
at the end of the list. 
Investors try to avoid competition and sell the goods directly to the 
consumers, in order to leave some room for prices to be increased -
especially transport and communication. 
Observing the situation in industry, we may say that the low capital cost of 
Japanese firms prevail in the world economy, only the great states of 
Western Europe and USA are able to compete with them. Foreign 
investors should find the possibilities to invest in industrial branches in 
Estonia using cheap labor forces and raw materials. 
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The most foreign investments are invested in Greater Tallinn and in the 
region surrounding it, the investments into Pärnu, Tartu, Viljandi, Jõgeva 
and Lääne Districts are also considerable. 
There is a great need for foreign investments in southöast and northeast 
Estonia. But it would be politically naive to think that these regions will 
become important tourism or commercial centers. It will be possible to 
speak about the commercial center only when there are people with high 
purchasing power in the society. 
A large part of the investment at the moment is reinvestment of retained 
earnings. Estonia has not advertised its advantages sufficiently - cheap, 
qualified workforce, che^ local raw materials, manufacturing 
management experience and proximity to the Eastern market. In sectors 
where manufacturing has been reinvigorated, it must be borne in mind that 
Estonian firms would not wish to have more foreign co  etitors. 
In order to channel investment into regions of Estonia outside Tallinn, the 
Economics Ministry is going to have to take initiative in' management. 
Local government funds and management skills are also needed. 
Analyzing firms the main attention has been paid to the cost of long-term 
credit so far. Ibere are three main sources that constitute the cost of long-
trem credit These are bonds, preferred stock and common stock. At the 
same tin^, approximately 70 % of the firms' capital (inventory) is made up 
of the sources of short-term credit in Estonia. Therefore the sources of 
short-term credit need to be investigated more thoroughly in Estonia. 
As for the short-term credit itself then the situation in Estonia is a 
paradoxical one where the short-term loans are more expencive than the 
long-term loans whereas the practice in developed countries proves the 
opposite. Why? Short-term loans are given by the domestic commercial 
banks with the average interest rate from 25 % to 40 % while the long-term 
loans are given in the process of an international assistance, mainly by 
World Bank. The average interest rate of these loans is between 11-18 %. 
The capital cost and loan interest show that the firm and the bank both 
accept the risk. The bank tries to get compensation for the high risk and 
forms the loan portfolio taking into account maximum compensation. Only 
when there is a bankruptcy tiireat, do banks speak about bad loans. 
The loans with interest rate of 60 % are bad loans. Firstof all, they are bad 
for firm, and they are bad for people who buy the products of that firm and 
also bad for the banks. High risk and great earnings are connected with risk 
premium, risk in economy means that the organization might loose money. 
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Failed banks have lost their money, others will too if the price of loans 
does not decrease. 
VI Conclusion 
1. Estonian has been successful in attracting foreign capital so far. 
Analysis shows that foreign investors have been increasingly in­
terested in Estonia. Increase can be noticed both in the number of 
new ente rises and in total amount of investment. 
2. The Estonian securities maricet has not been formed the stable and 
trusty information set to evaluate public finns and securities yet. 
The behaviour of the capital market is following the same pattern 
as capital markets of other states. The main difference between 
the С£ф11а1 market in Estonia and other capital markets is the par­
ticipation of foreign capital. There is many explanations for that 
and the future of the Estonian capital market will be strongly in­
fluenced by the inflow of foreign capital into that part of the 
economy. 
3. The cost of coital in its classical form is hard to examine because 
of the transition economy. The cost of equity can be evaluated 
when the secondary market functions perfectly. The sale of long-
term bonds is complicated as the demand for preferred stock is 
also very low. 
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Real estate 1.44% 
Rnance, Insurance 3.81% / тг port 1.85% 
Hotels, restaurants 0.51% Agriculture 0.14% 
Manufacture 50.62% 
Figure 1. Inestments by economic branches in 1994 
Finland 21% Sweden 27% 
Russia 12% 
Others 20% 
Ireland 4% Netherlands 2%\^ Denmark 1% 
Austria 2% Germani 3% 
Figure 2. Distribution of foreign investments in Estonia by states 
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ENTREPRENEURAL TRANSITION IN ESTONIA 
AND ITS IMPACT ON OVERALL 
TRANSFORMATION PROCESS - SPECIAL 




The former Soviet republics are striving for a common goal - a transition 
from the planned economy to a market economy - but from quite 
different paths. These different paths have been affected, not only by the 
pohtical decisions, but, more fundamentally, by the economic resources 
as well as various social and cultural factors of each coiyitry. 
Estonia was opted as the object of this research because of this guiding 
role. The fact that Estonia paved the way for transition does not 
necessarily imply that all the other former republics would follow in her 
footsteps, but even then the Estonian experiences can offer an interesting 
perspective into the study of the economic transition in other post-Soviet 
republics as well. The special role of Estonia becomes further stressed in 
the evaluation of entrepreneural transition, as Estonia can be regarded as 
the cradle of private entrepreneurship in the Soviet Union (Lugus et al., 
1991, 3-6). 
Workers' cooperatives can be considered the first steps taken in private 
entrepreneurship after the NEP period. In July 1987, Soviet Estonia had 
more registered cooperatives per inhabitant than any other Soviet 
republic. While Estonia had one cooperative per 20 ООО people, the 
Soviet Union had one cooperative serving an average of 80 ООО people 
(Slider, 1991, 797-821). Moreover, the significance of Soviet Estonia as 
the cradle of private entrepreneurship in the Soviet Union is emphasised 
by the active operation of foreign companies there. In order to analyse 
the present entrepreneural transition, the past of the Estonian 
entrepreneurship must be surveyed briefly. 
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2. Historical View on Entrepreneural Transition 
As Estonia separated herself from the Russian empire in 1918, her 
economy and enterprises were in ruins as a result of the World War I, the 
October Revolution and the following social upheaval within Estonia. 
The intact of these years of unrest upon the Estonian economy has been 
£ tly summarized by Raun (1987, 125), who states that "Estonia's 
industrial sector faced tremendous problems after nearly six years of 
upheaval and uncertainty in 1914-1920. To the obvious physical 
destruction was added the flight of capital and the elimination of 
traditional markets in the Russian hinterland." In addition to the loss of 
Russian markets, the extent of the loss suffered by the Estonian industry 
was huge; in 1920, for instance, Estonian metallurgy was fimctioning 
only with one-fifth of its pre-war capacity (Hinkkanen-Lievonen, 
1984,251). 
Business activities in Estonia were largely concentrated on the hands of 
the dominating foreign elite and the fairly small local bourgeoisie 
(Hinkkanen-Lievonen, 1984, 179). Alongside with this traditional 
aristocracy-bourgeoisie distribution, a private cooperative movement 
sprang up in Estonia. In 1939, ^proximately 300 consumer and 
producer cooperatives in banking, insurance and trade had a total 
membership of <270 ООО and a total turnover that exceeded the state 
budget by half (Van Arkadie - Karlson, 1992, 96). 
On the whole one can state that the expansion of Estonian 
entrepreneurship can be accounted for mercantilism rather than 
industrialization. The basis of entrepreneurship was formed from a large 
number of small and medium-sized enterprises, which operated in the 
manufacture and sale of agricultural products, as well as in the sale of 
consumer goods. Contributors to the growth of industrial ente rises, on 
the other hand, were mostly foreign companies and the Estonian state, 
which had the sufficient capital for investments. 
Summing up the entrepreneural transition of the 1920s and the 1930s, 
the Estonian enterprise sector can be seen to have developed 
considerably throughout the independence era, excluding the recession 
years of 1929-1933 in the world economy. The entrepreneural transition 
of Estonia became to a halt as a result of the "visible hand of socialism", 
which meant the deprivatization of industrial ente rises and banks, and 
the nationalization of foreign-owned companies. After this large-scale 
deprivatization, small private enterprises and agricultural ente rises 
began to be seized for state ownership (Raud, 1987, 91-94; Raun, 1987, 
151). According to Van Arkadie and Karlson (1992, 117), "by 1950 the 
three [Baltic republics] were barely distinguishable in their economic 
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organisadon, and in their political system, from the other Soviet 
republics." 
From the viewpoint of the Estonian ente rise sector, the following 
decades extremely stable, or even immobile; the state simply had a 
mcHK^ly over all entrepreneursMp. The state monopoly over 
ei^jxeneurship continued throu^out the рте-perestroika years. Private 
entrepreneurship did not come into being until the mid-1980s, when the 
reforms of perestroika sowed die seeds of private entrepreneurship. 
These reforms inclu(ted self-employment (Law on Individual Laboiu: in 
1985), co<^ratives (Law on Cooperation in 1987) and foreign-owned 
с(Н1фаше8 (Decree on Joint ventures in 1987). 
But the development of private entrepreneurship was far from being 
straiglttftvwaid: the first problem was the neglect of the private 
еп1егрт18е$ in the state plans, ^^ch in practice meant that private 
entnpises were oftrai forced to o^ain their supplies in the grey or black 
markets with an extremely high price, con^ared to ^at the state 
entoprises paid (Xueref, 1988; Cockburn, 1989, 176-179). However, 
entrepreneurship in Soviet Estonia managed to survive these tightened 
measises and began a new rise in mid-1990. In the background of this 
new growth was the construction of the foundations for the joint-stock 
сстфапу legislaticMi, i^iiich generated a registration boom of companies 
in Soviet Estonia. During 1990 alone, 4 790 new con^anies were 
legi^eied, of which 80 per erat were joint-stock companies (Liuhto, 
1992.31; Björk et ai., 1993> 5). 
The registraticMi of new coII anies doubled during 1991. All in all, 
dining that year, 11 369 new Estonian organizations were registered. 
A{q;)roximately 600 of these new companies were foreign-owned. The 
significance of this increase becomes evident ^iien con^ared to the 
number of fcneign c(nnpanies registered - 414 - in Soviet Estonia during 
January 13 in 1987 and December 31 in 1990 (Liuhto, 1994,11). 
One can conclude that the seeds of the current private entrepreneural 
transition in Estonia were sown before the independence of Estonia, but 
began to grow only ^en Estonia had declared her independence from 
the Soviet Union. The following ch^ ter will concentrate on 
investigating, on the basis of statistics, the development of tlie Estonian 
ent^^ise sector since the independence of Estonia, until the beginning 
of 1995. 
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3. Statistical View on Entrepreneural Transition in 
Independent Estonia 
The importance of Estonian independence for the expansion of the 
Estonian enterprise sector cannot be undermined. As early as the end of 
1991, a real registration boom of organizations began in Estonia, 
resulting in the total number of ente rises exceeding the level of 35 ООО 
organizations at the beginning of 1992. Since then the pace of 
organization registration has settled to an annual rate of about 15 ООО 
new organizations. By February 1995, the total number of registered 
organizations aheady exceeded 83 ООО (see Figure 1.). 
Figure 1. Entrepreneural Transition in Estonia 










However, one must once again point out that a large part of these 83 ООО 
registered organizations have never begun their operations at all. The 
fact that over 56 ООО registered organizations have no employees 
indicates of the vast number of non-operating organizations. 
Furthermore, when estimating the size of the Estonian enterprise sector, 
one must take into account that only 57 144 of the registered 83 ООО 
companies were real enterprises - the rest being farms and various kinds 
of associations. These combined, it may be assumed that at the beginning 
of 1995 the number of active enterprises in Estonia is only about 25000. 
The statistics from February 1995 show that the size of the registered 
organizations in Estonia is very small; all in all, 80 per cent of them have 
1/1992 1/1993 12/1993 2/1995 
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less than 5 employees. Similarly, companies with more than 100 
employees represent only 4 per cent of the Estonian ente rises. As the 
small-sized companies appear to employ more registration officials than 
actual workers, the employing capacity of all the Estonian organizations 
dropped from 833 ООО to 669 ООО (see Table 1.). 
Table 1. Transition of Registered Organizations by Personnel Size 
01.01.1992 01.02.1995 
Size of Number of Employed Numborof Employed 
personnel organ. workforce organ. workforce 
(share %) (share %) (share %) (share %) 
0-4 24 041(67.72) 20 484 ( 2.45) 68 195 (81.41) 27 696 ( 4.14) 
5-9 3 523(9.92) 22 761 (2-73) 5715(6.82) 37 589 ( 5.62) 
10-19 2 563 ( 7.22) 35143 ( 4.22) 3%8(4.74) 53 499 ( 8.00) 
20-49 2 608 (7.35) 80 009 ( 9.60) 3 360 (4.01) 102 645 (15.35) 
50-99 1 207 ( 3.40) 81 933 (9.83) 1 368(1.63) 92 897 (13.89) 
100-199 662(1.86) 92 285 (11.07) 662 ( 0.79) 90 960(13.60) 
200-499 598(1.68) 186 722(22.40) 360 (0.43) 107 223 (16.03) 
500-999 205 (0.57) 141 656 (17.00) 93(0.11) 62 416(9.33) 
over 1000 93 ( 0.26) 172 485 (20.69) 50 ( 0.06) 93 875 (14.04) 
TOTAL 35 500 ( 100) 833 478 (100) 83 771(100) 668 800 (100) 
The loss of 164 ООО jobs in an economy the size of Estonia has serious 
implications. This loss should have contributed to a corresponding 
increase in the rate of unemployment, which should be about 15 per cent. 
The official Estonian statistics on employment give the impression of the 
rate of unemployment being less than 2 per cent in Estonia (Aro, 1994, 
14). The lack of logic in this statistical detail may be explained by many 
workers, young in particular, having temporary jobs, rather than 
registering themselves unemployed. 
So far the transition in the Estonian enterprise sector has not been able to 
introduce exclusively positive results. But one of its positive effects is 
the disintegration of the state monopoly, which is demonstrated in the 
falling share of state and municipal enterprises - from one-fourth at the 
beginning of 1992 to a mere one per cent this year (see Figure 2.). 
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Figure 2. Transition of Ownership in Registered Enterprises in Estonia 







The fact that the reality is barer than the picture provided by the statistics 
seems to apply in this context as well. In other words, the share of state 
enterprises in the total employment and production remains very high. 
The investigation of the real ownership in the Estonian enterprise sector 
is further impeded by the question mark that still follows the ownership 
of joint-stock companies. When analysing the distribution of ownership 
in the Estonian enterprise sector, one must not forget the role of foreign 
ownership. At the moment, the share of foreign-owned companies in 
Estonia is nearly 15 per cent of all the registered companies. The foreign 
share has increased sha ly from its 5 per cent at the beginning of 1992. 
All in all, the impact of foreign companies upon the Estonian enterprise 
sector is many-sided. Foreign companies have introduced both positive 
and negative features. Examples of the more positive effects are the 
partial compensation for the collapse of Estonia's own manufacturing, 
the improvement of the variety and supply of services, as well as the 
increasing of management know-how. Thus the role of foreign 
companies in the Estonian entrepreneural transition should not by any 
means be undermined. 
On the other hand, the impact of foreign company activity upon Estonia 
also has its negative implications; first of all, larger resources of foreign 
companies may impede the development of the local ente rises. 
Secondly, several Western companies have rather maximized than 
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optimized their output. This is to say that certain foreign companies have 
unscrupulously taken advantage of the insufficient control and the 
transition conditions in Estonia. Thirdly, those "speculative foreign 
companies" that operate wavering somewhere between legal and illegal 
activity were among the first to rush forward and spread the "Western 
market economy doctrines" to Estonia, just as happened during the 
1920s (see Chapter 4.). 
The analysis of the Estonian ente rise sector by branch shows that half 
of the organizations registered in February 1995 concentrate on 
vv^olesale and retail trade. During 1992, their share was only one-fifth. 
All in all, this means that the number of organizations in wholesale and 
retail trade was multiplied by six times during the last three years, 
approaching the level of 40 ООО companies (see Table 2.). 
This trade orientation has also its negative features. Several of the 
organizations registered in statistics as retail trade shops have not begun 
their operations. According to some estimates, thousands of non-
operating companies were registered in retail trade. Secondly, a part of 
these organizations were established only for the purposes of one 
particular project. The large number of these "project companies" may 
perhaps refer more to the semi-legal markets than to real business 
activity. Thirdly, the majority of these companies in retail trade are very 
small, or even kiosks. This type of "miniature" entrepreneurship is by no 
means rare in Estonia. Even during the 1920s and the 1930s, a large 
number of shops - one shop per hundred people - was a predominant 
feature in Estonia. At the moment Estonia has 2.5 retail and wholesale 
organizations registered per hundred people. 
Table 2. Transition of Registered Organizations by Branch 
01.01.1992 01.02.1995 
BRANCH NUMBER SHARE NUMBER SHARE 
OF ORG. (%) OF ORG. (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Agriculture & forestry, 4 517 13.03 10 727 12.87 
Fishery 116 0.33 260 3.12 
Mining 45 0.13 83 0.10 
Industry 4 638 13.37 8 793 10.55 
Energy 140 0.40 430 0.52 
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1 2 3 4 5 
Construction 2 754 7.94 4 205 5.04 
Wholesale and trade 7 213 20.80 39 958 47.93 
Hotel and catering 2 504 7.22 3 678 4.41 
Transport. & comm. 1 599 4.61 3 081 3.70 
Finance 307 0.89 740 0.89 
Real estate & bus. ser. 4 219 12.17 8 985 10.78 
Social insur.&soc. ser. 6 626 19.11 12 335 14.80 
TOTAL 34 678 100 83 371 100 
Regionally viewed, the Estonian enterprise sector is highly concentrated 
on the capital city of Tallinn and the surrounding Haiju county, which 
together had half of the registered conq)anies at the beginning of 1995. 
Surprisingly, the central position of the capital region has even 
strengthened since 1992, when "only" 40 per cent of the companies were 
registered there (see Table 3.). 
Several factors seem to support the central position of the capital. To 
begin with, a large part of the Estonian manufacturing is concentrated on 
the capital region. The shares of Tallinn and two northeastern towns, 
Narva and Kohtla-Järve, account for about 70 per cent of the economic 
activity (Kilvits, 1993, 4). Secondly, the administrative organs important 
for business are situated in Tallinn. Thirdly, those Estonian companies 
operating in foreign trade or with foreign companies benefit from a 
location in the capital region, where over 60 per cent of the foreign-
owned companies are registered (Liuhto, 1994, 28). 
Table 3. Transition of Registered Organizations by Location 
01.01.1992 01.02.1995 
Number Share % Number Share % 
1 2 3 4 
Harju county 14 472 40.77 39 093 46.89 
Tallinn 11 861 33.41 33 891 40.65 
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1 2 3 4 
Hiiu county 484 1.36 751 0.90 
Ida-Viru county 2 935 8.27 5 712 6.85 
Kohtla-Järve 921 2.59 1453 1.74 
Narva 1 132 3.19 1 808 2.17 
Sillamäe 100 0.28 492 0.59 
Jõgeva county 1 036 2.92 1 941 2.33 
Järva county 1 380 3.89 2 094 2.51 
Lääne county 879 2.48 1 994 2.39 
Lääne-Viru county 1 375 3.87 3 368 4.04 
Põlva county 686 1.93 2 454 2.94 
Pärnu county 2 831 7.97 5 520 6.62 
Pämu 1 199 3.38 2 765 3.32 
К£ф1а county 814 2.29 1 741 2.09 
Saare county 989 2.79 2 210 2.65 
Tartu county 4 057 11.43 8 790 10.54 
Tartu 2 358 6.64 5 732 6.88 
Valga county 775 2.18 1 999 2.40 
Viljandi cöünty 1 992 5.61 3 493 4.19 
Võru county 795 2.24 2211 2.65 
TOTAL 35 500 100 83 371 100 
4. Foreign investment activity in Estonia 
Preconditions for the development foreign-owned company actitivity in 
Soviet Estonia were created in the beginning of 1987. The Joint Venture 
Act allowed Western companies to return to the Estonian territory after 
an absence of almost fifty years. During the first year, only thuteen 
foreign-owned companies had been registered in Soviet Estonia. The 
registration pace remained similarly low in 1988 (see Figure 3.). 
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Joint venturing began in full speed only in 1989, when 60 new joint 
ventures were established in Soviet Estonia. Despite the fast increasing 
number of joint ventures in 1989 compared to the previous years, this 
group of about 80 companies was still a very modest result from three 
years of joint venturing. With the enactment of the new joint stock 
company law, foreign companies became more eager to enter the Soviet 
Estonian market. A rush of foreign companies into Estonia began when 
Estonia gained her independence during the coup the etat which led to 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union. During the first months of 
independence, the registration rate of foreign-owned companies was 
almost 200 per mondi. The total numb^ of joint ventures exceeded 2500 
ahready in the summer of 1992. In June 1992 Estonia introduced her new 
currency: the kroon (Eesti kroon). During the first half of 1994, about 
1300 new foreign-owned companies had been established, and their total 
number in July 1994 had risen to 7612 con^anies. 
Figure 3. The Number of Foreign-owned Companies in Estonia 
Foraign-owned Companies in Estonia 
12Л7 4/89 9/89 12/89 7/90 1/91 1(^91 7/92 1/93 4/93 7/93 1/94 4/94 7/94 
The statistics published by the Estonian Ministry of Economy indicate 
that foreign investments have increased by over one billion kroons per 
year (1 July 1993 - 1 July 1994). This is a significant rate indeed if we 
compare it to the 300 million kroons which was the increase in foreign 
investments in the previous year. On the whole, foreign investments had 
by July 1994 ascended to 4.1 billion kroons (see Figure 4.) 
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Figure 4. Foreign Investments in Estonia 






7/B2 1/93 4/93 7/93 1/M 4/94 7/94 
The total capital stock of foreign-owned companies had increased to 
almost 9.4 billion kroons by July 1994. The share of foreign investments 
has increased from 30% to 40% during the two years following July 
1992. When st^udying foreign shares, however, one has to remember that 
the shares were higher in October 1991 than they are at the present - the 
foreign investments comprised then nearly 50% of the total investments 
(see Figure 5.). 
Figure 5. The Development of Foreign Share in the 1990s (per cent from 
the total JV capital) 
The development of foreign share in the 1990's 
per cent from the total JV capital 
1/91 10/91 7/92 1/93 4/93 7/93 1  ^ 4/94 7)04 
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From the group of major investors, two countries - Sweden and Finland -
clearly distinguish themselves. The total investments made by these two 
countries rose to 2 billion kroons by July 1994 and comprised 45% of all 
the foreign investments. These Nordic countries are followed by the CIS 
countries and the former Yugoslavia. Together the latter two form one 
fifth from the total foreign investments. The sectoral investigation shows 
that in the first six monts of 1994, a half of the foreign investment was 
directed in industry and 40% in retail and whole sale (see Table 4.). 
Table 4. The Distribution of Foreign Investment by Branch in the First 
Half of 1994 
Branch Investments Share 
(nm kroons) (%) 
Industry 718 51 
Retail and wholesale 568 41 
Finance 53 4 
Transport 23 2 
Estate and commercial services 20 1 
Hotel and catering 7 0 
Agriculture 2 0 
Others 11 1 
Total 1402 100 
The eight years of foreign companies in Estonia can be summarised in 
the following way; 
1) Foreign companies were established fairly hesitantly in Estonia 
until the middle of 1990 when foreign-owned corporations were 
allowed to be registered, 
2) The second boom in foreign company registration began in the 
latter half of 1993. 
3) Also foreign investments have begun a steady increase in the lat­
ter half of 1993. 
4) The share of foreign investments has grown substantially from 
July 1993 onwards. 
5) The number of totally owned subsidiaries grows strongly. 
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6) The number of registered foreign-owned companies increases 
faster than foreign investments, which is reflected in the decrease 
of the average size of foreign investments. 
7) Sweden has been the largest single investor in Estonia since 1991. 
8) Finnish companies have been the most active founders of com­
panies in Estonia since 1987. 
9) Companies from Western Europe and USA rush to the Estonian 
market. 
10) The shares of several countries have first collapsed and then be­
gun to rise again. Such countries are, for instance, the former 
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. 
11)The sectoral distribution has remained fairly stable during these 
eight years: industry has attracted highest foreign investments, 
and services and sales the largest number of companies. 
12)Tallinn and its province. Harju, have attracted most of the in­
vestments and half of the registered companies. 
13) A considerable amount of registered companies has -not begun to 
operate at all. However, the share of those operating has started to 
rise. 
14) The average size of the personnel in foreign companies remains 
low. 
15)The business activities of foreign-owned companies rises steadily 
both inside the Estonian market and abroad. 
16)The role of foreign trade is not as central as it was in the 1980s 
because companies can now change the kroons they earn in the 
Estonian market into hard currency. 
17)The business environment has developed considerably thus sup­
porting foreign company activity in Estonia. 
18)The Estonian business legislation is one of the most developed 
ones in transition economies despite its few inadequacies. 
19) An increasing number of companies are using Estonia as their 
foothold for other Baltic markets. 
20)The statistics on foreign-owned companies are inadequate and 
differ widely from one another. 
5. Conclusion 
Most of the researches dealing with transition economies stress the 
uniqueness of transition process. Naturally, in a context as wide as Üiis, 
world history does not recognize any analogous phenomena. But at least 
in terms of economic transition alone, the phenomenon is not entirely 
unique. The economy and business activities of Estonia studied in this 
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article experienced a transition similar to the present circumstances 
already during the 1920s and the 1930s, when Estonia declared her 
independence from the Russian Empire. These two eras share, for 
instance, the loss of Eastern markets and manufacturing contacts, strong 
orientation to West, increase in foreign investments, need for a 
construction of national economy, and the increasing reflection of 
national culture in business and the management culture of companies. 
The second lesson to be learned from the present transition of the 
Estonian enterprise sector is that an ente rise sector will rapidly 
develop from selling from suitcases to trade in kiosks, and from shops to 
industrial manufacturing. A similar course of events occurred very 
r^idly during the NEP period in Soviet Russia. 
The example of Estonia also indicates that a small nation at least is able 
to change the economic structures rapidly without upsetting the social 
foundations or resulting in an overheated economy. The progress of the 
Estonian transition has also been affected by a strong sense of shared 
national spirit and strive for constructing an independent nation. Various 
psychological factors play an equally vital role in the construction of an 
economy as the cold economic facts do. 
Thirdly, the transition of the Estonian ente rise sector can provide an 
interesting view on the development of entrepreneurship in other 
transition economies. The majority of companies in Estonia, as in many 
other transition economies, operate in four subareas: trade, supply, 
services and small industry. "Diese four straws of entrepreneurship have 
the potential for becoming the supporting pillars of a healthy economy. 
The experiences of the Estonian enterprise sector prove that foreign 
companies can both rehabilitate and damage the development of these 
infant industries in transition economies. The Estonian example shows 
that a more liberal policy toward foreign companies gains better results 
than an environment which could only attract speculators from abroad or 
keep even them outside the borders. 
In addition to the factors mentioned above, the study of the transition in 
the Estonian enterprise sector will inevitably reveal the fact that the 
statistics and monitoring system of companies have failed to follow on 
the heels of skyrocketed entrepreneurship. On account of insufficient 
registration and control, many transition economies loose annually more 
in tax income than a construction of a functioning monitoring system 
would cost. 
The transition economies are well aware of this particular situation, but 
their problem is the existence of dozens of various other targets which 
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are even more in^ortant than the Шфгоуетеп1 of the enterprise 
registration. To correct these particular defects, the Western countries 
could lend a helping hand to transition economies, as their efforts would 
pay them back very soon. Moreover, this way the statistical chaos in the 
transition ^onomies could be shaped into information for analyses, 
which could further help in directing financial aid to suitable targets and 
decrease the present misuse. 
It seems impropriate to end this article with a few words by Kozminski, 
ч^еге he underlines the role of the enterprise sector in the 
implementation of transition. According to Kozminski (1993, 145), 
"managers of post-communist enterprises have to assun» this leadership 
role in the milieu of sudden discontinuity and dramatic change. They are 
the only ones potentially с£фаЬ1е of translating changes in the macro-
economic environment into corresponding micro-economic behaviour of 
the firms. Otherwise, transformation to a market economy will not 
happen." 
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BANKING RISKS OF TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES: THEIR SPECIFICITY AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Mart Sõrg 
The economy today is characterized by rapid changes. Besides other 
important reasons these changes have also been caused by the collapse 
of socialist economic system and by the attempt of the reforming 
countries to introduce a capitalist economic system and integrate into the 
world economy. In the present situation the task of banks to evaluate the 
risks has become crucially important. Walter Wriston, chairman and 
chief executive of Citico  between 1970 and 1984 has said: "The fact is 
that bankers are in the business of managing risk. Pure and simple, that is 
the business of banking." (1, p.3) His remark has been gaining 
acceptance in recent years. 
Banking risks in transition economies are similar to those in developed 
countries. But in transition economies the level of risk is much higher, 
the causes are different and the possibilities of risk management are 
more limited than in stable market economies. Proceeding from these 
differences the profits of bank owners might be enormous, but the price 
of failures might also be very high. The experiences of the Estonian 
banking industry have shown that the risk of the owners and clients to 
lose their money is more probable in transition economies than in stable 
market economies. 
The essence and characteristic features of banking risks 
Scientists usually mention three to ten different banking risks in 
textbooks. The textbook Commercial Bank Management presents ten 
important banking risks: credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, interest 
rate risk, earnings risk, solvency risk, inflation risk, currency or 
exchange rate risk, political risk, and crime risk (2, p. 140-145). The first 
six are considered to be the main types of risk and the last four are other 
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fonns of risk in the banking industry. We could say that the last four of 
them are especially important for banks in transition economies as they 
operate mainly at the domestic level, so dividing risks according to their 
importance is relatively subjective. 
Another textbook, Commercial Bank Financial Management, presents 
only three types of banking risk." Bank risk managment focuses on three 
key portfolio risks: credit risk, interest rate risk, and liquidity risk. These 
risks arise fix>m unexpected changes in borrowers' abilities to repay 
loans, unexpected changes in interest rates, and unexpected changes in 
balance sheet flows, respectively." (3, p.380) 
Most monogr^hs and textbooks present the number of risks between the 
above given limits. Scientists do not often consider solvency risk a 
separate risk factor but as part of liquidity risk. Some textbooks dealing 
with international banking introduce the term country risk. The above 
given treatment of banking risks do not answer the question why the 
level of risk in the banking industry is higher than in other fields of 
entrepreneurship. The next part of this paper deals with that issue. 
Our position is that the level of risk in the banking industry is higher 
because of the contradictory aims of banking activities, the profit and 
service objectives of the banks and the peculiarities of the bank's balance 
sheet structure regarding the many different risks that are concentrated in 
banks. 
Banks fulfill two contradictory social tasks. On one side, the bank is a 
business and its aim is to produce capital profit. On the other side, the 
bank is an important part of the state's infrastructure, the centre of 
issuing the medium of exchange (money), the circulation channel and 
reservoir of money. Because of the essential role of banks in the 
economy, governments try to regulate and control them more severely 
than other businesses. We may see that there exists two contradictions in 
banking: 1) between the aims of banks and their social functions, and 2) 
between liberty for banking enterprises and other fields of 
entrepreneurship. These contradictions very often cause risk. 
The services (production) of banks include transportation of money from 
one owner to the other and issuing additional means of exchange with 
the help of credit. The value of a concrete currency depends greately on 
the amount of trust in it. Banks, even the central bank, are only to a 
certain extent able to guarantee the trustworthiness of a certain currency. 
Guaranteeing the trustworthiness of currency, and influencing the value 
of currency are to a great extent beyond the power of banks. Even great 
well-developed countries are helpless when the trust in their currency is 
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decreasing. E.g. the rapid decrease of the value of the US dollar versus 
the Japanese yen in the beginning of 1995. The risk level of money is 
comparable to that of agricultural production. The latter is influenced by 
weather, natural catastrophies, diseases, etc. Most countries have imple­
mented the system of supporting agricultural production. Different 
measures have been used for that purpose - subsidies, loans, 
etc.Attempts to defend the value of currency by reducing salaries, social 
costs and other economic-political measures are very often not 
appreciated by people. That is why only insufficient monetary measures 
are often used (decreasing the money supply). 
The high level of risk in the banking industry is also caused by the 
differences between banks and other businesses. In banks, equity is 
minor part of a bank's assets. In business the share of equity should be 
much greater than the share of borrowed funds and the banks use credit 
requirements in tending to companies in order to control the debt-to-
equity ratio. As it was mentioned earlier, it is possible to earn high profit 
in banks. As the owners' equity is many times smaller than the sum of 
money that could earn great profits in banks, the owners have a great 
temptation to risk this large sum to increase profit, earned with the help 
of using the money that belongs other to people. The simple calculations 
show that if the capital stock is 10% and the net profit of using the bank 
assets is 10%, the owners' profit ratio is 100%. 
Compared to other areas of the economy, the level of risk is one of the 
highest in the banking industry. In transition economies, where economic 
risks are enormous and trust in currency is insufficient, the possibilities 
to lose or to win are especially great. That is why the banks in transition 
economies attract owners who are willing to take a risk. After liber­
alization of the banking system the boom of establishing banks usually 
begins. E.g. after liberalization of banking the number of banks 
operating in Poland mushroomed. At the end of 1990, there were akeady 
75 nationwide banks (including 30 with a majority share of private 
capital), 104 cooperative banks that broke away from BGZ and 1,562 
small cooperative banks affiliated with BGZ (4, p. 15). The situation was 
similar in Estonia. At the end of 1993, the number of conmercial banks 
was 42, or one bank per 40,000 people. 
The effect of a transition economy on the banlcing rislcs 
The peculiarity of a transition economy is that the processes of 
dismantling the old economic system and creating a new one are 
simultaneous. The former structures do not function successfully any 
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more and the new ones are not able to ftmction properly yet. This 
situation has a negative influence on the economic environment and it 
results in an economic crisis. The situation is as uncomfortable as living 
in a house that is being renovated. Many people do not think that the 
falling living standard and the decrease of social guarantees are 
unavoidable in transition economies. They try to find solutions to these 
problems with the help of the former communists, who gain power again 
and stop the reforms. Doing this, the risk of banks increases. The risk is 
connected with a decrease in the production of goods and services, 
replacing old markets with new ones, having a high inflation rate, 
insufficiencies in legislation, a high rate of delinquency etc.. 
One of the greatest risks in banks is the political risk, meaning changes 
in reform policy. Such changes influence the business environment and 
might bring about great losses to banks. E.g. One part of the party 
(Koonderakond) that won the elections on March 5, 1995 in Estonia 
introduced a bill to the newly elected Parliament to temporarily suspend 
the reforms. If Parliament had passed the bill, the banks that were 
oriented more to the new market economic structures (e.g. that had 
bought the privatization vouchers) would have suffered great losses. Life 
has shown that the reform process in post-socialist countries has its 
recessions and it is very difficult to forecast them. 
Economic decline increases the risk to the banking industry. As we can 
see in Table 1, GDP in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania decreased by half 
between 1989- 1993. 
Table 1. Real GDP (%) (5) 
Hungary Poland Slovakia Lithuania Latvia Estonia 
1989 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1990 96 88 97 95 96,5 96,4 
1991 86 81 "82 82,2 88,5 84,3 
1992 81 82 77 51,5 58,5 62,4 
1993 43,3 46,9 58,7 
The decrease in GDP means that cash flow decreases and banks have 
difficulties repaying loans. The future prospects of many enterprises are 
not the best, and their motivation to pay the loans back is very weak, as 
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it is impossible for them to get new loans. Banks might handle a single 
case of a delinquent borrower, but it would be in difficulties with many 
delinguent borrowers. 
Economic rearrangements and restructuring during the transition period 
make it very difficult to forecast the risk. On one hand, restructuring is 
connected with the establishment of a number of new firms. Many old 
organizations are privatized or are on the edge of bankruptcy. On the 
other hand, the economy has to reorient itself from old markets to new 
ones. In some cases the reorientation is very rapid and abrupt. Table 2 
shows us that after gaining independence in 1991 Estonia lost many 
trade partners in the East (mainly Russia) and had to replace these 
relations with western economic ties. 
Table 2. Structure of Estonian foreign trade in 1990-92 (%) (6,  p. 173) 
Country EXPORTS IMPORTS 
1990 1991 1992 1990 1991 1992 
USSR (former) 94.1 94.7 41.8 82.0 84.8 40.9 
Rest of world 5.9 5.3 58.2 18.0 15.2 59.1 
Russia 55.0 56.5 18.1 51.8 45.9 32.5 
Ukraine 13.2 12.9 5.7 7.7 7.9 2.3 
Byelorussia 4.6 4.1 1.1 4.4 4.9 1.7 
Latvia 5.7 7.7 10.0 4.7 5.1 1.4 
Lithuania 3.1 3.8 1.3 3.2 6.3 1.7 
Finland 1.1 2.3 22.4 1.6 2.0 29.4 
Sweden 0.4 0.5 9.0 0.1 0.8 6.6 
Germany 0.3 0.2 4.3 0.1 0.8 7.6 
Netherlands 0.06 0.3 5.0 0.2 0.1 1.6 
U.S.A 0.2 0.1 2.0 0.9 3.5 3.2 
Estonia was successftil in reorienting its economy, the foreign trade 
capacity increased two times in 1993 and the growth continued in 1994 
(according to the data of the Estonian Bank it was 71%). The situation 
was favorable to those commercial banks that had forecast such 
development (e.g. Hansapank) jmd caused much difficulties to those who 
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hoped that the trade relations with former socialist countries would be 
reestablished. 
Proceeding from the situation described above, the banks have 
difßculties in longterm forecasting, as it is almost impossible to get 
comparable statistical data. The new economic system requires rear­
rangements in statistics, but the data collected according to the old 
system are not comparable to the new data. The problems in transition 
economies are also connected with the developmental models. Very 
often the models offered by western economists do not suit the rapidly 
changing situation (e.g. as it was in 1993 in Estonia, where the foreign 
trade capacity increased two times). Banks also have difficulties drafting 
the longterm interest rate policy, as the inflation in transition economies 
is rapid and volatile (Table 3). 
Table 3. Monthly inflation rate in the Baltic states in the first half of 
1994 (the change (%) in comparison with the previous month) 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
January 5,5 3,8 4,8 
February 5,2 3,4 2,9 
March 8,9 1,7 3,3 
April 3,1 2,7 1,6 
May 1,1 0,2 6,2 
June 0,7 2,0 2,1 
The other peculiarities of transition economy banking are connected with 
the fact that legislation does not correspond to the new economic 
situation. It is also typical to the situation that the Central Bank's 
supervision and control are weak. Very often drawbacks and weaknesses 
found in the work of one bank might cause panic among the clients of 
other banks, as clients lack reliable information about the financial status 
of their bank. Banks are also annoyed by the high level of delinquency, 
as state power is rather weak and the banks are not well protected. 
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The effect of the developmental level of banking on risks 
In postsocialist countries banks have changed a lot. The aim of banks in 
socialist countries was to serve the conmiand economy, but in the market 
economy their aim is to make a profit. During the transition period the 
old banking system was dismantled and the new one established and this 
situation brings about additional risks. As an economy in transition is in 
crisis and there are problems in preserving the value of money, it is very 
likely that not all banks are able to survive. The reasons are structural, 
financial and educational. 
The essential structural reason is the fact that at the beginning of the 
transition period too many small banks were established and their 
locations do not correspond to the needs of entrepreneurship. The 
international auditing сопфапу Price Waterhouse concluded in its 
published banking survey for 1993 that the banking density is quite high 
in the Baltics; highest in Latvia. Estonia has 21 banks for a population of 
1,6 million, Lithuania has 24 banks against 3,7 million people. And 
Latvia has a whopping 60 and a population of 2,8 million. Many of the 
banks are rather small, and the survey predicted it is likely that the 
banking industry will be affected by major restructuring (8). We may 
add that before the banking crisis the banking density in Estonia was 
сопфагаЫе to that of Latvia - at the end of 1992 there were 42 
conunercial banks in Estonia. 
Financial problems of banks are mostly connected with the fact that the 
banks are rather small, they have existed for a short time and many loans 
might be called "bad." Mr. Olari Taal, the Executive Chairman of the 
Estonian Savings Bank (Eesti Hoiupank) describes the so called vicious 
circle situation as following: "The average loan interest rate is not falling 
this year, although according to our countryrisk the average interest rate 
should be 14-15%, but it is 21-22%. The reasons for that are the follow­
ing: 
• the number of banks is too big, meaning that the banks try to buy 
up money "at any price" and pay high interest rates; 
• bad loan portfolios and the wish to compensate for tuture losses 
(giving credit with high interest rates is connected with high risk). 
The specialists think that about 12-14% of all bank loans are so-
called "bad" loans. Taking the situation of the Social Bank 
(Sotsiaalpank) as an example, we should admit that it is not an ex­
aggeration; 
• the loan interest rate and inflation influence each other. "(9) 
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The profit of small banks is rather small. The profit is used for covering 
the personnel costs, costs of implementing modem banking technology 
and also loan losses. There will not be much left for equity growth and 
for establishment of a reserve fund. 
The short history of market economic banking industry has not been able 
to teach banks to cooperate in order to find ways to minimize the risks, 
E,g.large loan losses have forced Estonian banks to create the system of 
registrating "bad" clients (Creditinformation). Most banks are akeady 
connected to that system. But because of the opposition of large banks it 
has not been possible to create a system of savings insurance. It is 
understandable, as the large banks are afraid of being forced to pay for 
the risks of small banks. 
Educational problems are caused by the fact that Estonia lacks old 
banking traditions. The old staff of banks is clinging to the old working 
methods and the new staff has not obtained the principles of risk 
management yet. 
Risk in banking is also caused by the bank owners' misunderstandings 
about investment in banking. Two kinds of problem are connected with 
that statement. First, as the future of the bank and the investor are 
unpredictable, the investor wishes to get the maximum earnings per 
share. E.g. the highest earning per share (60%) in Estonia in 1991 was in 
the Tartu Commercial Bank (Tartu Kommertspank), but this bank went 
bankrupt in 1992 and the depositors did not get back all their savings. 
The Estonian Social Bank (Eesti Sotsiaalpank) paid 40% per share to 
their shareholders in 1993, although the problem of loan losses was 
akeady acute then. Second, banks' shareholders try to buy the essential 
part of shares in order to become a member of the board and to the gat 
loans that are greater is amount than their capital stock invested in the 
bank. Most banks in Estonia have given large loans to the bank owners, 
and the loan terms have been very favorable (some gave the loans 
without interest). 
The effect of the attitude of banks' clients on the banlcing 
risks 
Everybody in transition countries was used to the fact that depositing in 
banks was totally free from risk. The state banking system and strict 
regulations in banking guaranteed that depositing was riskless. After 
establishing commercial banks and the structural reform in the economy 
it became clear that people might lose their money even in banks. The 
clients started to insist on risk insurance. Many enterprises turned back 
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to cash turnover (for small entrepreneurs it is possible to hide their 
taxable profit this way). That is why the deposits are rather expensive to 
the banks. The annual interest rate on term deposits is still often 15% or 
more in Estonia. Nevertheless the amount of cash circulating outside the 
banking sector is increasing more rapidly than recent money supply 
(table 4). 
Table 4. Location of the issued cash in Estonia (mln. EEK) (10, p. 69) 









01.01.1993 1228 151 1077 
01.01.1994 2730 350 2380 
01.04.1994 2731 311 2420 
01.07.1994 2983 327 1656 
01.10.1994 3153 323 2830 
01.01.1995 3512 440 3072 
High risks connected with domestic currency and domestic banks have 
forced the owners of money to use more stable currencies. Ratna Sahay 
and Carlos A. Vegh have presented the facts that the dollarization ratio 
(the ratio of foreign currency deposits to broad money, inclusive of 
foreign currency deposits) has been rather high in all transition 
economies, not only in the postsocialist states. In the Baltic states, the 
dollarization ratio peaked at around 60 per cent in Estonia (second 
quarter of 1992), 50 per cent in Lithuania (first quarter of 1994), and 
35% in Latvia (first quarter of 1995). These three countries successfully 
implemented disinflation programs during 1993, leading to a substantial 
reduction in the dollarization ratios in Estonia and Lithuania (11, p.37). 
The dollarization ratio is a negative criteri on of the trustability of 
currency. The experiences of Slovenia, Poland, Latvia and some other 
countries have shown that even a low level of inflation is not always able 
to reduce the dollarization ratios. 
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The conclusion is that risk for b£inks is increasing when clients do not 
trust domestic currency. The banks should take into account that the 
number of dishonest clients is greater in transition economies than in 
stable market economies. That is why it is impossible to use measures 
for simplifying and of reducing the cost credit and settlement. 
Because of the fall of living standards and the economic crisis in 
transition economies bank clients are rather poor and change very often. 
Banks waste much time obtaining information about the clients' financial 
background and evaluating their fiiture prospects. The banks' 
possibilities to do research in this field are limited as the competition 
between banks is very in tense and because of the difficulties in 
obtaining necessary information. 
In conclusion, it is necessary to stress that the level of risk in the banking 
industry in transition economies is much higher than in stable market 
economies and the possibilities for risk management are also limited. 
Because of the specific features of risk and of the scarce bank and 
governmental resources the risk management experiences in transition 
economies are absent. The intuition of politicians and bank leaders serve 
as the main instrument of avoiding the risk. It is also possible to leam 
from mistakes, but it means that the depositors, owners and taxpayers 
pay for these lessons in risk management. 
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INVESTMENT FUNDS AND THE ESTONIAN 
SECURITIES MARKET 
Piret Reinson 
ТЪе first steps of creating a capital market in Estonia were made in 1991 
when the first shares were issued. The first investment fund was founded 
in 1993 - that was Eesti Börside Investeerimisfond - an open-ended fimd, 
the purchase and sale of the fund's shares is intermitted by die Securities 
Board at the moment. Besides the fund hadn't a lisence yet. The first 
government bonds were also issued the same year that is 1993. During 
the last two years 18 investment funds have been established in Estonia, 
11 of them are of open-end type. One can suppose that new investment 
funds will be established and that some of them will leave the market. 
It's really difficult for open-ended funds to exist in our securities market 
and to allocate their resources in compliance with the legislation. Only 
closed-ended funds and privatization funds can survive in our securities 
market today. It's not a lack of discipline or supervision. Firstly the 
Estonian capital market is too small, secondly we don't have sufficiently 
securities that can guarantee liquidity and thirdly we haven't an active 
secondary market. Our Investment Fund Act is being really often 
discussed these days. The fund managers have said that the easiest and 
perhaps the only possible way of making the portfolio of an open-ended 
fund in compliance with the Investment Fund Act is to invest in western 
countries that have a great variety of securities. Thus - our legislation 
favours the export of capital. Also has been said that investment funds 
could specialise (by market sectors, securities etc.) but there aren't so 
many opportunities to specialise in Estonia. 
According to experts the volume of a securities market should be at least 
10-15 billion kroons in case we want it to be normally functioning that is 
approximately 13 times bigger than now. So, the annual volume of new 
issues has to be more than 900 million kroons. At the end of 1994 there 
were securities worth of 950 million kroons in our securities market from 
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which bonds constituted 48,2%, shares 31,6% and shares of open-ended 
funds 20,2%. ("Äripäev", 20.01.95) 
Theoretically can this 900 million kroons really achieved but for that we 
need a lot more foreign investments and the money invested abroad 
should be brought back to Estonia. But I just drew your attention to the 
fact that open-ended funds can survive only by investing in foreign 
markets. Besides our political and economic risks are too high for the 
most of foreign investors especially after the elections. The Estonians 
blew the fear of left-wing government too big thus influencing foreign 
investors who hadn't come here yet. 
The crisis in some open-ended funds brought out the weaknesses of the 
Securities Board as well. The Securities Board is the regulatory agency 
responsible for the oversight of the securities market and its professional 
participants. As it often happens in Estonia the main energy is put on 
consequences. It's the proper time to think of educating professional 
fund managers and analysts. It seems that privatization funds have a 
future in our capital market as the privatization vouchers embody an 
invaluable potential and enlivens the Estonian capital market and the 
whole Estonian economy. 
The establishment of the Estonian Central Depository in 1994 had a very 
positive impact on the development of privatization and closed-ended 
funds and in the long run on the whole of the securities market. In 
essence, it's the secondary market for the shares of privatization and 
closed-ended funds. It's of a high probability that because of the 
peculiarities of our securities market there will be no traditional Stock 
Exchange in Estonia at all. 
Small investors as a class will survive only through privatization funds. 
As of today there are 3,6 billion opened EVP-accounts (privatization 
voucher accounts). The majority of the shareholders of the EUF 
(Privatization Trust Fund) are civilians, altogether 1257 shareholders. 
The first emission lasted from the 2nd of January to the 31st of March. 
Approximately 3/4 of the shareholders are 50 years old and older. The 
average amount of the shares bought was 1700 10-kroons worth shares. 
The development of privatization funds is immensely important for the 
Estonian economy and therefore should be supported. The biggest 
danger at the moment is the attitude of a new government. If the 
government will change the course of privatization then the results are 
unpredictable and that means instability. 
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THE PRECONDITIONS AND HINDRANCES FOR 
MODELLING OF TRANSFORMING 
PROCESSES 
Tiiu Paas 
In order to understand and predict the development of economic 
processes as complicated dynamic systems it is important to use the 
possibilities provided by economic and econometric modelling. The 
importance of modelling increases in situations and periods where and 
when great economic and political restructuring is taking place. Political 
and economic decisions have to be empirically checked and generalized. 
Economic and econometric models with concurrent infosystems are 
important tools for successful co-operation and integration for countries 
with developed markets economies as well as for those with trans­
forming economies. 
The most important precondition for modelling of transforming 
processes is the real need to generalize in quantitative terms the 
transforming processes and to support the policymakers in evaluation of 
different policy proposals from local, subnational and international 
agencies. Not only the extremely difficult task of governing the economy 
in transitionary countries, but also the more modest ambition of 
monitoring the development is seriously impeded by the virtual absence 
of analytical tools and systematic collection of relevant data in a 
consistent framework. 
Positive preconditions for the econometric modelling of transforming 
economies are based on comparatively good education of economists of 
post-socialist countries in mathematics and statistics, and on the 
comprehensive experience in elaborating and using macroeconometric 
models for planning and analyzing economic development in the former 
Soviet Union and other socialist countries of Eastern and Central 
Europe. 
The most important hindrances for successful modelling is due lack of 
reliable and comparable statistical data, especially time series needed to 
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elaborate applied econometric models for transition countries, and due to 
absence of a basic development strategy for transforming economies. 
The process of economic transformation and restructuring is bound to be 
long and complex. The experience has showed a delay between the time 
the decision for a transformation program is taken, and the time its 
implementation begins. Some essential political and institutional reform 
measures have not yet been implemented, and other still possess their 
centrally planned character. Those factors also aggravate the elaborating 
and implementing of econometric models for transition period. 
In view of elaborating and implementing econometric models in order to 
generalize transforming and integration processes the collaboration 
between economists from different countries is indispensable. The most 
important fields for this collaboration are the development of modelling 
paradigms and creation of internationally comparable information 
systems for analyzing and modelling of economies with different 
political background. 
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ESTONIAN SECURITY MARKET: PRESENT 
STATE AND DEVELOPMENT 
Ljudmila Šorikova 
The re-establishment of Estonian security maricet started in 1992, when 
the government decree no. 6 was adopted ( on Jan, 9, 1992). This decree 
served as a basis for standardisation of security market activities and 
creating legislation concerning security market. 
Characterising the situation in security market in 1992-1995 and 
comparing it with the situation in developed countries, where the 
infrastructure and legislation has been formed abready , Estonian security 
market was still in the developing stage. In 1992 there were ten 
organisations who dealt with security brokerage and auctions. It was 
only in April 1995, when the real electronic security exchange that met 
the international requirements was established in Tallinn. The Tallinn 
Securities exchange was established by 23 financial organisations and its 
capital cost was 2.300.000 EEK. The Central Depository and Central 
Register of Privatisation Securities plays an important role in the 
Estonian security market infrastructure. Its main aim is to escrow the 
securities and to fix the deals about property rights. In order to create the 
perfect infrastructure, more attention should be paid on the development 
of broking. Hansapank and company Pindi Invest are the dominating 
markers in Estonia, they also deal with the securities of other issuers. 
Market is supervised and controlled by Board of Securities of Ministry 
of Finances. We may say that the security market infrastructure in 
Estonia has already been established. 
Total turnover of the Estonian security market in 1994 was the largest in 
the Baltic countries - $ 82.000.000 (In Latvia it was 23.000.000 and in 
Lithuania 38.000.000).The turnover has grown due to the large scale 
issuing of securities by the trustworthy issuers. The role of bonds at the 
market in 1994 was 48,2%, followed by the role of stocks (31,6%) and 
shares of mutual fund (20.2%). The securities sold for the privatisation 
vouchers dominate at the primary security market. The secondary market 
is unstable and small scale. At present there are three types of securities 
in Estonia that are sold at the secondary market; the equities of Tallinn 
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Kaubamaja and the bond of Hüvitusfond (Recoupment Foundation). The 
secondary market is not very active as most of the stocks are inscribed 
and the stock holders can not realise them. The reason for tliat lies in 
legislation but also in the strategies of companies. 
One of the essential problems at the security market is the 
trustworthiness of the quotations. Different banks and brokers offer 
different quotations to the one and the same tool. They proceed from 
their strategic aims but not from the real market demand and supply. We 
hope that the quotations of the Tallinn Securities Exchange LTD. will 
serve as examples for others. 
The package of laws, introduced in 1993-1994 was an important stage in 
the development of Estonian Security Market, but because of the 
contradiction and low quality of these laws, they also create several 
[H-oblems. 
The development of Estonian Security Market is mainly, connected with 
improving its legislative basis and brokerage, introducing new financial 
tools increasing the market turnover and making the controlling more 
efficient. Despite these problems, we can say that the security market in 
Estonia is existing. For developing it into a well-fimctioning and useful 
system, the process should be conscientiously managed. 
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CERTIFICATION OF AUDITORS IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA 
Enn Leppik 
With the developnwnt of market economy the necessity for certified 
auditors is increasing. 
The Government of Estonian Republic has sanctioned a provisional 
decree about audit services and according to this decree the Board of 
Audit Activities has been founded to administrate, co-ordinate and 
control these services. One aim of the Board of Auditing Activities is 
auditors certification. 
In Estonia the person who has higher business or juridical education, 
experiences in accounting, controlling or economics and who has 
obtained the certificate about his qualification, has the right to become 
an auditor. 
To get the certificate about qualification the person has to take the exam 
according to the requirements set by the Board of Audit Activities. In 
1991 first auditors were certified according to these requirements. 
People have different possibilities to prepare for this exam; they leam 
independently, participate in certain programs or courses, take part in 
practical training in audit firms. 
The exam consists of different questions concerning audit arrangement, 
financial statement, management accounting, taxation, co o ate finance 
and business structure (legal and organisational). 
In certification of auditors and in audit arrangement the Estonian 
Auditing Standards play an important role. At present the following audit 
regulations are in force: Audit and the other functions of auditor; the 
basic terminology in auditing; relations between clients and auditors; 
audit planning; audit performance; auditor's documents, auditor's 
reports; ethic principles of auditor's work. 
Auditors' certification examinations are held two times a year (in spring 
and in autumn). Up to now 50 - 70% of people taking the exam have 
passed it. At the beginning of this year, there were 272 certified auditors 
in Estonia. 
90 
NEED OF SUPPLEMENTAL KNOWLEDGE 
ABOUT FINANCIAL MATTERS FOR 
MANAGERS 
Jüri Rünkla 
Transition from the environment of planned economy to maiicet 
economy is a very complex process of conversion. Besides the 
jurisdictional and economic rearrangements during the process it is 
necessary for all members of community to have an opportunity to revise 
and reorganize their minds according to the changed conditions. 
Unfortunately the mental readiness to understand the necessity for 
acquiring new knowledge and attitudes is not self-evident and rapid one. 
The education and practical experience for major part of business 
managers comes mostiy from socialist economic environment. The basic 
difference between the latter and market economy from the point of view 
of an employee lies in following three points: 
1. The initiative of every person is becoming significat, because the 
dynamic business environment offers more opportunities than the 
previous static and suppressing one. 
2. The accurate performance by an employee according to central­
ized plans is replaced by the need for competent and rapid deci­
sions in changing economic situations. 
3. The personal responsibility of everyone for economically effective 
results is growing with the transition from the relatively risk-free 
environment to the challenging one. 
The executives and managers have to be competent in financial 
problems, which were under-estimated in the conditions of the previous 
system. Financial accounting in socialist ente rises was mostiy for 
registration only and not a management tool. Entrepreneurial profit-
earning firm has to manage current financial and market information for 
decision-marking on the real-time basis and according to it the 
corresponding professionals have to possess the required knowledge and 
skills. Unfortunately the employees even with the university degree in 
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economics with a quarter of a century active working career ahead of 
them have very poor readiness for fulfilling these new tasks. There is a 
great deficiency in understanding financial matters and know-how. 
Managers can leam from making business, but such lessons are very 
expensive. Transition process needs an efficient system of adult 
economic and managerial education on a wide basis. It is not possible to 
wait until the new generation comes and takes over all jobs. A lot of 
trends may by themselves lead to unwanted results not to be reversed in 
future. And the community has no rational purpose to throw 
thoughtlessly away a great part of existing professional know-how of 
educated and experienced members because of the lack of some specific 
knowledge required in changed economical situation. 
Organizing supplemental managerial refreshing courses needs exact 
goalsetting, determination of target group, drawing up rational programs, 
selection of lecturers with practical experience in both economical 
systems, readiness of managers and specialists to accept and apply new 
way of thinking and financial support to provide such courses for adult 
professionals on a wide basis. Up to the present the supplementary 
courses for financial and accounting professionals are going on without 
the support from state budget. The courses are mostly carriend out by 
different educational institutions as brief making the acquittance with 
requirements of new laws at the expense of interested firms and some 
funds. The needs of transition processes in economy require a much 
greater attention and systematic approach to adult supplementary studies. 
In connection with new European integrity it is not only a local Estonian 
problem, but a regional one. It is necessary to find support from some 
specific fund for converting the East-European economy and apply a 
specific project as soon as possible. Such a solution is evidently suitable 
not only for Estonia, but is acute in other Baltic and East-European 
states too. 
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THE POSSIBILITIES TO FUND THE ESTONIAN 
RRMS WITH THE HELP OF BRIDGE LOANS 
Nsdežda Ivanoya 
One of the most important issues in the development of Estonian 
entrepreneurship is the problem of finding long-term financial resources. 
The main sources for funding business are: share issue, bond issue, bank 
loans, and profit. 
After establishing tiie Estonian security market, large businesses will 
have the possibility to get loan capital from the security market. In 
con^>arison with the bank loans the advantage of the issuing the share of 
a firm is the lower price of money. On the other hand the issuing of share 
has been standardised and this process is more complicated and time-
consuming. 
Bank loan is very flexible financial tool. At the present situatsion in 
Estonia, it is rather difficult to get the loan; taking into account the high 
interest rate, bank loan is not favourable for the developing firms. (The 
role of long term bank loans has been increasing, especially due to the 
foreign loan. In the February 1994 the share of foreign loans in kroons 
was 15,6 % but in the February 1995 it was already 30,5 %, it has grown 
fi-om 67,7 million EEKs up to 114,3 million EEKs.The average interest 
rates on long term loans have increased fi-om 16,20 % up to 16,70 %). 
In the present conditions our firms are interested in the system of 
combined financing,widely spread in well-developed countries, i.e. 
bridge loans. Bridge loan is a short term loan used forimplementing 
business projectonly in its first stage, later the firm will use shares or 
bonds in order to return the loan. These loans may cover almost half of 
the firm's investments, but in case the borrower has not got the guarantee 
from the bank about redemption of the securities, the loan might become 
risky. That is why the commercial bank as a rule agrees to give 
bridgeloan only in case the borrower firm has a contract with the 
underwriter about buying the remaining securities after the public sale. 
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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN 
TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
Eve Parts 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region has a long-run potential to 
become an important and stable part of the world market, if political and 
economic transformation will be successful. Therefore CEE is also 
assumed to have an increasing importance as a host region for foreign 
direct investments (FDI). According to IMF estimations, cumulative FDI 
flows to this region could rise to exceed $50 billion during the 1990s. By 
world standards, the inflows into region remain small. In 1986-1990 
CEE countries received about 0.1 % and in 1992 3% of global FDI 
inflows. In present, this upward trend is slowing down because of (a) 
recession in ГО1 home economies and (b) transitional problems in CEE 
economies. 
Considering the structure of the FDI in CEE, we can first notice 
considerable gap between registered and operational investments. 
Second trend is the concentration of ГО1 in a small number of countries 
(Hungary, Russia, Poland, Czech Republic), which reflects the degrees 
of liberalisation of regulatory regimes for FDI, as well as the differences 
in their location advantages. Third, with few exceptions, investors in the 
CEE economies tend to be small or medium-sized firms. Most 
investments range from $45 ООО to $1.5 million. 
Leaving aside the external influencies and concentrating on internal 
determinants of FDI, the following common problem areas concerning 
the investment climate can be identified: 
1) Regulatory conditions - the instability in the legal conditions for 
FDI (including the matter of property rights) has in itself consti­
tuted a major deterrent to foreign investors. 
2) Economic conditions - the CEE economies are passing through a 
severe economic crisis reflected in sha  declines in industrial 
output, the collapse of traditional export markets, rising unem­
ployment and strong inflationary pressures. The Central European 
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Economies may recover sooner, but the deep structural roots of 
the crisis suggest that it will be of a prolonged nature for all. 
3) Political conditions - governments face serious economic and so­
cial problems. The collapse of communist monolithic, one-party 
rule has initiated process that have led to the disintegration of fed­
eral structures in some countries of the region. As result, foreign 
investors often find themselves enmeshed in jurisdictional con­
flicts among competing authorities. 
4) Institutional conditions - the process of marketization, privatiza­
tion and reintegration into the world economy will inevitably be 
long and difficult. Meanwhile, the inadequate institutional legacies 
create obstacles to FDI: underdeveloped markets (especially 
capital markets), inefficient state sector, weak domestic currencies 
and foreign exchange controls, a fledging commercial banking 
system, insufficient telecommunication facilities and management 
and accounting practices that differ significantly from interna­
tional standards. 
In the long run, if above listed bottlenecks would be eliminated, the 
probable changes could occure because the CEE countries are 
potentially very attractive to foreign investors. The advantages of the 
region that could entice investments in the framework of regional core 
network strategies of TNCs are following: 
• high industrialization levels 
• European traditions and historical links which promote numan re­
lations and understanding in transnational firms (despite the lack 
of western business culture) 
• highly developed human resources combined with relatively low 
labour costs 
• quite large domestic markets with unsatisfied demand 
• geographical proximity to the EU market 
• availability of abundant natural resources in some countries, es­
pecially energy sources 
• privatization of state enterprises, the process which accounted for 
67% of the total FDI inflows to EEC in period 1988-92. 
Last but not least, there is an aspect of the role of FDI in the transition 
process which has received little attention: for the countries of CEE to 
become competitive in the world economy, it is not only important that 
they attract FDI and benefit from the assets associated with it. They also 
need to insert themselves actively - and competitively - in the world 
market and the emerging integrated production system by undertaking 




Deposits are these, what make bank an owner of the finance. Deposits 
are most important source of the bank. 
Deposits are the base of the profit How to manage deposits? In this field 
banks have two questions: 
1) uliat kind of deposits help to minimize expenditures when bank 
increases its resoceres, 
2) how can bank increase amount of deposits to obtain the protected 
capasity of loans and take into account other financial aims. 
General demand for deposits determines the structure of the deposits in 
the bank. It's almost for a single bank impossible to increase demand for 
deposits. 
Bank can influence the structure of the deposits by the deposit policy. 
Deposit policy accounts different factors; 
• interest rate level 
• base of calculating interest rates 
• different types of deposits 
• different terms of deposits 
• advertising the depositing prospects 
• Service fees 
Bank mus create different deposits for different groups of depositors. 
For that banks need regular market researches and analyses to do timely 
supply. 
Savers can be divided as following: 
1) liquidity-oriented (short term deposits) 
2) future-oriented (long term deposits) 
3) income-oriented (high intrest rate deposits) 
4) objective-oriented (deposits, which help to get set objective). 
Taking into consideration all these aspects bank can form its deposit 
policy. 
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